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Structural 4ups 
By MICHAEL WOODFORD 
University of Chicago 
I would like to thank Julio Rotemberg for many important discus- 
sions of the issues addressed here, the Universita2 Commerciale L. 
Bocconi, Milano, for the opportunity to develop these ideas in a 
series of lectures there, and Olivier Blanchard for helpful com- 
ments on an earlier draft. 
M ANY ACCOUNTS of research in macro- 
economics during the past fifteen years 
describe two important developments-the 
resurgence of neoclassical analysis under the 
banner of "real business cycle theory," and a 
"new Keynesian" literature that has sought to 
provide rigorous microeconomic foundations 
for traditional Keynesian (and monetarist) 
doctrines. Such a description of the field 
often leads to the conclusion that recent aca- 
demic research has contributed little of im- 
portance to the practical analysis of pressing 
issues of public policy. (For a recent example, 
see Paul Krugman 1994, ch. 8.) For the neo- 
classical literature, with its assumption of ef- 
ficient resource allocation by perfectly com- 
petitive markets, is dismissed as a triumph of 
tidy logic over practical realism, while the 
"new Keynesian" literature is presented as an 
attempt to ease the consciences of academic 
theorists, while contributing few new conclu- 
sions relative to traditional analyses. 
Such a dismal conclusion about the prog- 
ress of macroeconomics, however, overlooks 
a significant body of research over this pe- 
riod, that has concerned itself with the 
macroeconomic consequences of imperfec- 
tions in labor markets, in goods markets, and 
in credit markets. This literature represents 
a significant departure from traditional 
(Keynesian and monetarist) styles of macro- 
economic analysis, in its concern with the de- 
terminants of aggregate supply, as opposed to 
an exclusive emphasis upon aggregate de- 
mand. Yet it shows that a concern with real 
factors, with the supply side, and with equi- 
librium modeling (in a broad sense) hardly 
implies that one must deny the existence of 
involuntary unemployment, deny that reces- 
sions involve an increase in the inefficiency 
with which productive resources are used, or 
deny an important role to government poli- 
cies in causing and potentially in ameliorating 
fluctuations in economic activity. What these 
analyses, however, have generally lacked, is a 
clear sense of how these various analyses of 
particular problems in particular markets 
might contribute to a complete theory of 
the determination of employment and aggre- 
gate economic activity-in the absence of 
which it has been difficult to see whether the 
literature leads to any genuinely new per- 
spective on the nature of aggregate fluctua- 
tions or on the appropriate design of public 
policy. 
Edmund Phelps' new book, Structural 
Slurrps, offers a bold attempt at the synthetic 
treatment that this work has until now lacked. 
He presents a systematic analysis of the 
determinants of aggregate employment and 
* Structural Slumps: The Modern Equilibrium 
Theory of Unemployment, Interest, and Assets. By 
EDMUND S. PHELPS. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994, pp. xiv, 420. ISBN 0-674- 
84373-8. 
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economic activity, in which the new micro- 
economic models of labor market and prod- 
uct market imperfections are placed at center 
stage. Most of the elements of the "modern 
theory" that he elaborates have been intro- 
duced previously into the academic litera- 
ture, by Phelps himself and often by others. 
But the book breaks considerable new 
ground in showing how these various partial 
analyses can be combined in a single coher- 
ent model-and a complete dynamic general 
equilibrium model (ultimately, a multi-coun- 
try model) at that. This general equilibrium 
perspective throws into sharp relief both the 
features of the partial models that are ulti- 
mately of the greatest significance for the 
analysis of macroeconomic shocks and poli- 
cies, and the respects in which these models 
most badly need further elaboration if they 
are to be usable for detailed analysis of that 
kind. 
The book also grounds these particular 
analyses in an over-arching project, and 
shows that it implies more than a minor re- 
finement of one's view of macroeconomic 
theory. It presents them as implications of a 
general view of the functioning of markets- 
one in which imperfect information, not 
about aggregate states but about trading op- 
portunities with particular agents, and about 
the private actions of those agents that affect 
the nature of what is obtained from transac- 
tions with them, crucially shapes the kind of 
trading relationships that develop. To an im- 
portant extent, this view of the market pro- 
cess differs from that underlying both tradi- 
tional macroeconomics and that of the 
modern neoclassical school. For the postwar 
"neoclassical sythesis" taught that simple neo- 
classical parables were correct in their ac- 
count of the fundamental determinants of the 
equilibrium allocation of resources-it was 
simply held that it takes time for prices to 
adjust in response to these forces, as a result 
of which additional "disequilibrium" phenom- 
ena could be important in the short run. 
Phelps' more radical proposal offers a new 
view of the forces that shape equilibrium, and 
shows that the achievement of equilibrium- 
in the sense of a state in which each party 
acts on the basis of a correct understanding 
of how others' choices affect the conse- 
quences of his own-in no way implies either 
stability or efficiency. 
At the same time, the book illustrates the 
way in which the complete theory can be ap- 
plied to the analysis of a wide range of par- 
ticular shocks and policies. The book presents 
illustrative analyses of, among other issues, 
the effects upon employment and economic 
activity of productivity growth, commodity- 
price shocks, changes in the level and struc- 
ture of government spending, growth of the 
public debt, changes in the level and struc- 
ture of taxation, changes in unemployment 
benefits, and of the effects upon an open 
economy of a variety of types of changes in 
conditions abroad. The results obtained are 
often different, sometimes broadly and more 
often in subtle respects, from those implied 
by familiar Keynesian models, by familiar 
neoclassical models, or both. 
The project is one of startling ambition, 
and the book deserves to be widely read and 
discussed. It will surely excite considerable 
controversy. I wish to begin that debate here, 
with a critical review of the main lines of the 
book's argument. 
1. Why Market Structure Matters 
Phelps' treatment of the determinants of 
employment and economic activity differs 
from traditional (Keynesian and monetarist) 
accounts not only in fine details, but in the 
overall structure of the theory. It emphasizes 
real, as opposed to monetary, factors; it gives 
pride of place to the determinants of ag- 
gregate supply, as opposed to an exclusive 
emphasis upon aggregate demand; and it con- 
cerns itself solely with equilibrium explana- 
tions-in the broader sense mentioned 
above-meaning among other things that the 
terms of trade are chosen by the transacting 
parties, rather than imposed upon them (per- 
haps as a result of a prior commitment made 
under expectations that have since been falsi- 
fied). He is careful to point out that he does 
not mean to deny the importance of mone- 
tary factors, nominal rigidities, or expecta- 
tional errors as sources of additional transi- 
tory dynamics, superimposed upon the 
slower-moving shifts in the equilibrium level 
of employment and output, with which the 
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present book is solely concerned. But such 
factors play no role in the analyses offered 
here, and the impression given by the quanti- 
tative decomposition of postwar fluctuations 
in unemployment into components attributed 
to alternative sources, in Chapter 18, is that 
the author regards them as playing a minor 
role in practice. 
This shift in perspective is dictated, not 
solely by the theoretical criticisms of the 
Keynesian mechanisms with which we are all 
now familiar (and to which the author con- 
tributed so notably in the 1960s), but above 
all by a practical concern with fluctuations in 
economic performance that seem too persist- 
ent to be disequilibrium phenomena. 
[My] premise is that the monetary approach, 
though still an indispensable perspective on 
high-frequency fluctuations, cannot plausibly 
explain the long swings in the unemployment 
rate. To understand the protracted world 
boom from the late 1940s to the late 1960s, 
the nearly global recession of the 1970s, and 
the 1980s depression over much of the world, 
we need models showing how shifts in real 
supplies and demands disturb the equilib- 
rium employment path. (p. 245) 
It might be wondered, then, why Phelps 
does not simply endorse the program of "real 
business cycle theory." The answer given in 
the book is that he regards the assumption 
that actual markets are well-described by the 
textbook model of competitive equilibrium, 
with its implication that resources are inevita- 
bly allocated to their most efficient uses, as 
plainly contrary to fact. And as alternative 
models of the functioning of markets exist, 
that he regards as more descriptive of how 
individual markets actually operate, it seems 
obvious that macroeconomic theory should 
be constructed upon this foundation. 
In fact, I believe that more can be said 
about the importance for macroeconomics of 
considering alternative market structures. Of 
course the capacity to connect with micro- 
economic studies of labor and product mar- 
kets is an important strength of the kind of 
theory that Phelps seeks to construct; but the 
present volume is actually very little con- 
cerned with such studies. What the book is 
mainly about, and where it succeeds bril- 
liantly, is in its discussion of the architecture 
of macroeconomic theories, the way in which 
alternative assumptions fit together to yield 
conclusions of' practical importance. And in 
fact the author's different view of the func- 
tioning of labor and product markets is of 
crucial importance for the kind of theory of 
aggregate fluctuations that he eventually ar- 
rives at. 
For under the assumption of frictionless, 
competitive markets, one has a great deal of 
difficulty in explaining why, under plausible 
assumptions, aggregate shocks, and policy 
changes-even the sorts of real factors to 
which he directs attention-should cause sig- 
nificant changes in equilibrium employment. 
To see why this is so-and thus, why an alter- 
native view of market structure is crucial to 
his enterprise-it is necessary to review the 
aggregative neoclassical theory of fluctuations 
in aggregate employment and output devel- 
oped in the 1980s at the Universities of Roch- 
ester and Minnesota.1 
1.1 The Aggregative Neoclassical Model 
This model assumes, first of all, an aggre- 
gate production function of the form 
Y=AF(K,H), (1.1) 
where Y is aggregate output, K the capital 
stock, H the labor input (hours worked), F a 
concave, homogeneous degree one function, 
increasing in both arguments, and A a techni- 
cal productivity factor. If the representative 
firm is a price-taker in both its product mar- 
ket and the labor market, it follows that one 
condition for competitive equilibrium is that 
the real wage w be equal to the demand wage 
given by 
wd(H) = A FH(K, H). (1.2) 
1 For surveys of the approach that I refer to, 
see, e.g., Robert Barro (1989) and Bennett McCal- 
lum (1989). For a general exposition of macro- 
economic theory from this point of view, see Barro 
(1987). I will refer to "the neoclassical theory" 
rather than to "real business cycle theory," be- 
cause the scope of the neoclassical literature is 
somewhat broader than a sole concern with ex- 
plaining business cycles or with the effects of 
"technology shocks," as the Barro survey shows; 
and Phelps's concerns in the present volume actu- 
ally have more to do with the issues taken up in 
that survey. 
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Equation (1.2) defines labor demand at any 
given real wage, given the capital stock and 
the state of technology. 
The model also assumes a representative 
household, that seeks to maximize the ex- 
pected value of a discounted sum of utilities, 
with utility in each period being an increasing 
function of consumption C and a decreasing 
function of hours worked H. The additive 
separability of utility over time allows the 
household's optimal decisions to be charac- 
terized by a pair of Frisch demand functions, 
Cd(X, w) and Hs(X, w), indicating desired 
consumption and hours worked as a function 
of the household's current marginal utility of 
income X and the current real wage. (On the 
nature and uses of Frisch demands, see, e.g., 
James Heckman 1974.) The advantage of this 
formalism is that all effects of household 
wealth, non-wage income, interest rates, and 
expectations about future conditions affecting 
the household's budget, can be reduced to a 
consideration of their effects upon a single 
state variable, the marginal utility of income. 
For a given value of X, the aggregate labor 
supply curve is then given by 
H=Hs(X,w). (1.3) 
Conditions (1.2) and (1.3) then suffice to 
determine equilibrium hours worked, as well 
as the real wage, for a given capital stock, 
state of technology, and marginal utility of in- 
come of the representative household. Sub- 
stitution of equilibrium hours worked into 
(1.1) then gives equilibrium output as a func- 
tion of these same factors. 
An immediate consequence of this view of 
output and employment determination is that 
both output and hours worked may be re- 
duced by payroll taxes or taxes on labor in- 
come, that drive a wedge between the cost of 
labor to the firm (the real wage that appears 
in (1.2)) and the after-tax wage received by 
the household (the real wage that appears in 
(1.3)).2 Thus the theory predicts that equilib- 
rium employment and output should be af- 
fected by a variety of supply-side factors. 
There is also, potentially, a role for aggre- 
gate demand in output determination. This 
comes about through the dependence of la- 
bor supply upon the marginal utility of in- 
come. Writing the solution to equations 
(1.1)-(1.3) for aggregate output as Ys(X), one 
obtains a sort of aggregate supply curve. The 
curve is upward-sloping, because (if leisure is 
a normal good) a higher marginal utility of 
income induces greater labor supply at any 
given real wage, increasing equilibrium hours 
worked. The equilibrium value of X must 
then satisfy the product market clearing con- 
dition 
Y(X) = yd(X), (1.4) 
where yd(X) represents the dependence of 
aggregate demand upon this variable (and 
here, as in the aggregate supply relation, 
other arguments of the function have been 
suppressed). An increase in aggregate de- 
mand can thus increase equilibrium output 
by inducing an increase in the value of X. 
For example, in the case of a model with a 
fixed capital stock, the aggregate demand 
curve is given by 
yd(X) = Cd(X, w*(X, K, A)) + G 
where G represents government purchases 
and w*(X, K, A) indicates the real wage that 
satisfies equations (1.2)-(1.3). It is evident 
that an increase in government purchases 
shifts the aggregate demand curve to the 
right by the amount of this increase, with the 
result that in equilibrium X must rise to such 
an extent that (1.4) continues to hold. (From 
the point of view of the household's intertem- 
poral optimization problem, the increase in 
the current marginal utility of income reflects 
some combination of an expected reduction 
of lifetime wealth, due to the increase in 
taxes that must occur at some point in order 
to finance the higher level of government 
purchases, and an increase in the real rate of 
interest, if the government's claim on re- 
sources is higher at present than it is ex- 
pected to be in the future.) The higher value 
of X implies an outward shift of the labor sup- 
ply curve, as a result of which the labor mar- 
2 For this conclusion, however, one must verify 
that the effects of this wedge are not offset by the 
wealth effect on labor supply, appearing in the 
above analysis as an increase in X. The prediction 
is therefore clearest in the case of a revenue-neu- 
tral change in the structure of taxation, that in- 
creases the marginal tax rate on labor income 
and/or firms' wage bills. 
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ket clears at a lower real wage and a larger 
number of hours worked, implying in turn 
greater equilibrium output. 
1.2. Disadvantages of the Neoclassical 
Model 
Such an analytical framework, however, has 
a great deal of difficulty in explaining why, 
under plausible assumptions, aggregate 
shocks and policies should cause significant 
changes in equilibrium employment. A first 
problem is that the variations in the labor in- 
put predicted by this theory have no neces- 
sary connection with variations in employ- 
ment. The most natural interpretation of the 
model just sketched is as one in which each 
household is predicted to vary the hours that 
it works in response to changes in the real 
wage, the real interest rate, and so on, but in 
which the number of people working never 
changes.3 Such an account of fluctuations in 
economic activity might capture some aspects 
of the phenomenon, but at the price of saying 
nothing about the issue that is probably of 
greatest public concern-the source of in- 
creases in unemployment. 
This issue can, in principle, be addressed 
within the neoclassical framework by inter- 
preting the variations in H as actually repre- 
senting variations in the number of persons 
working a shift of fixed length-the variation 
occurring on the extensive margin in equilib- 
rium due to some technological or utility- 
based advantage of discrete shifts of work. 
Such a model with "indivisible labor" can 
yield predictions identical to the simple 
model just sketched, if one interprets the 
"representative household" as being made up 
of a large number of persons, who pool their 
income and make joint decisions about work 
and consumption. Under a more sophisti- 
cated variant proposed by Gary Hansen 
(1985) and Richard Rogerson (1988), one can 
obtain the same result without budget-pool- 
ing if the identical households perfectly in- 
sure one another against the risk of not being 
chosen for employment. But even so, the 
model is not one that allows for unemploy- 
ment as the term is usually understood; 
rather, variations in hours worked are attrib- 
uted entirely to variations in labor force par- 
ticipation. The model can thus purport to 
address the phenomenon of measured unem- 
ployment only under the assertion that the 
distinction between persons voluntarily not 
working and persons currently unemployed 
but seeking work-central to the way in 
which official statistics are computed, to pub- 
lic attitudes toward the problem of unem- 
ployment, and to the administration of at 
least some systems of unemployment bene- 
fits-is a totally spurious one. An unwilling- 
ness to accept this contention leads Phelps to 
seek an alternative model of the labor mar- 
ket. 
Even setting aside this issue, the model's 
description of hours worked as equalling de- 
sired labor supply at all times is awkward for 
another reason. It follows immediately that 
the model will not predict significant vari- 
ations in employment as a result of aggregate 
shocks or policy changes, except insofar as 
desired household labor supply is assumed to 
be quite elastic in its response to variations in 
wages and interest rates. Yet econometric 
studies of individual labor supply typically 
find evidence of only very small responses of 
labor supply to such variables, especially in 
the case of adult men; for surveys see John 
Pencavel (1986) and David Card (1994). 
Nor is this the only difficulty. Suppose that 
one grants the assumption, common in the 
neoclassical literature, of a highly elastic la- 
bor supply curve for the representative 
household. It remains difficult for the model 
to explain large fluctuations in equilibrium 
employment. For equations (1.2)-(1.3) deter- 
mine equilibrium hours as a function only of 
the capital stock, the current state of technol- 
ogy, and the marginal utility of income. The 
capital stock changes only slowly, and so if 
one sets aside changes in the productivity fac- 
tor A, shocks can affect equilibrium employ- 
ment only insofar as they change households' 
perceived marginal utility of income. This is, 
in particular, the only channel through which 
any disturbance to aggregate demand can 
3 Hence the real business cycle literature, in 
discussing the quantitative adequacy of the neo- 
classical model, usually compares the model's pre- 
dictions with data on variations in total man-hours 
worked, rather than with data on employment, let 
alone unemployment. 
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have an effect-including embodied technical 
progress, which does not change the produc- 
tivity of existing capital goods. 
I have shown above how, in the neoclassi- 
cal theory, shocks to aggregate demand can 
affect the value of X. But this is not an espe- 
cially plausible channel from which to expect 
large fluctuations in equilibrium employ- 
ment. Note that it assumes that the house- 
holds whose labor supply must vary have no 
difficulty shifting income over time in re- 
sponse to changes in interest rates or income 
expectations. Consider instead the case of a 
"liquidity-constrained" household h-cur- 
rently borrowing to the extent that it can to 
finance current consumption, and so not in- 
clined to change the amount that it saves in 
response to any small change in wages or in- 
terest rates. This means that, over some 
range of possible variations in prices, the 
household's choices (Ch, Hh) are constrained 
by the budget constraint 
Ch = w Hh + yw (1.5) 
where yw represents net available income 
from sources other than current wages. Sub- 
stituting the Frisch demands for household h 
into (1.5) yields an equation that determines 
Xh as a function of w and yw. This means that 
a disturbance to aggregate demand, such as 
an increase in government purchases (in the 
absence of an immediate increase in the taxes 
of household h) or an increase in investment 
demand as a result of a technical innovation, 
can have no effect upon the marginal utility 
of income, and hence upon the labor supply 
schedule, of household h.4 Similar conclu- 
sions may be reached if household h saves, 
but has access only to an asset (say, a savings 
account) the real return on which does not 
increase much when market interest rates 
rise, or if household h is simply not a sophis- 
ticated financial planner. In short, the 
mechanism by which aggregate demand dis- 
turbances can affect employment in the neo- 
classical model depends upon a great deal of 
sensitivity to financial markets and changes in 
income expectations in the part of the popu- 
lation for which it is least plausible.5 
There remains the possibility of explaining 
variations in equilibrium employment as due 
to shifts in the technology factor A, and this is 
exactly the route taken by real business cycle 
theory. Relying upon "technology shocks," 
however, has the disadvantage that they are 
not easily identified with any independently 
observable events.6 Indeed, it is somewhat 
doubtful that actual random variations in the 
pace of technical progress have the proper- 
ties needed for this to be a significant source 
of employment fluctuations. The theory relies 
upon shocks to aggregate production possi- 
bilities, while it seems likely that actual inno- 
vations usually benefit only narrow sectors of 
the economy, and there is no reason to expect 
the random arrivals of innovations across sec- 
tors to be correlated. The theory relies upon 
disembodied technical progress, because only 
in this case is the demand wage relation (1.2) 
immediately affected by the innovation, but 
actual innovations seldom affect production 
possibilities until new capital goods can be 
produced and put into use. And the theory 
relies upon sudden shifts in technology to ex- 
plain business cycles, while microeconomic 
studies of the adoption of technical innova- 
4 Note that in general such a model requires 
that the economy not be made up solely of liquid- 
ity-constrained households like h. For example, if 
government purchases increase while taxes paid by 
households Like h do not, the additional govern- 
ment spending must be financed by increased 
holdings of government bonds by other house- 
holds, that are evidently not liquidity-constrained. 
But if bondholders make a negigible contribution 
to aggregate labor supply, the conclusions ob- 
tained by reasoning from a consideration of the 
situation of household h remain correct. 
5 Even granting the plausibility of these factors 
as determinants of labor supply, a theory of the 
effects of government purchases as due to a shift 
in labor supply does not square well with the ob- 
servations about the effects of increases in U.S. 
military purchases reported by Rotemberg and 
myself (1992b). In particular, we find that in- 
creases in military purchases raise real wages at 
the same time as they increase private sector em- 
ployment and output, while the neoclassical model 
predicts a real wage decrease. 
6 Exogenous increases in energy prices are 
sometimes cited as an example, but Jue to the 
small share of energy costs in total marginal costs, 
even large increases in energy prices, like those of 
the 1970s, should not shift down the demand wage 
to a very large extent, if firms behave competi- 
tively. This is documented numerically in Rotem- 
berg and Woodford (1994). 
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tions typically find that innovations diffuse 
through the economy only over a period of 
years.7 
And even granting the occurrence of shifts 
in the productivity factor A, the neoclassical 
model does not predict that such shifts 
should affect equilibrium employment as 
much as they should change the equilibrium 
real wage. For while an increase in A should 
raise the demand wage at each number of 
hours worked H, it should also increase the 
wage that households require in order to sup- 
ply that quantity of labor, due to the improve- 
ment in household wealth (lowering X). And 
indeed, even when the elasticity of household 
labor supply is assigned extremely high val- 
ues, real business cycle models tend to pre- 
dict too little procyclical variation in hours 
worked, and too much procyclical variation in 
real wages, to match the characteristics of ac- 
tual business cycles. 
Thus, even granting the existence of a 
highly elastic labor supply curve, the neoclas- 
sical model does not allow aggregate distur- 
bances to affect equilibrium employment in 
the short run, except through channels of 
doubtful plausibility-the sensitivity of labor 
supply to changes in interest rates and in- 
come expectations, and disembodied techni- 
cal progress. Thus a theory that aims to ex- 
plain the greater part of the observed 
fluctuations in employment as an equilibrium 
phenomenon also needs some other source of 
fluctuations in labor demand, in addition to 
the factors that affect the neoclassical labor 
demand curve (1.2). 
Phelps shows how these defects of the neo- 
classical model can be remedied if one adopts 
an alternative view of the organization of la- 
bor and product markets. In the alternative 
view, markets can be in equilibrium-in the 
sense that each party transacts optimally 
given a correct understanding of the way his 
opportunities are affected by the choices of 
others-despite the fact that the market wage 
exceeds the reservation wages of unemployed 
workers, and the market price of goods ex- 
ceeds the marginal cost at which firms could 
supply more of them. These noncompetitive 
outcomes, he argues, are consequences of 
people's being forced to transact on the basis 
of imperfect information-not about overall 
market conditions, but about the particular 
people that one transacts with or might po- 
tentially transact with. 
His theory overcomes the first two difficul- 
ties with the neoclassical model-the inabil- 
ity to explain involuntary unemployment, and 
the inability to explain large fluctuations in 
employment in response to aggregate shocks 
without assuming preferences in regard to la- 
bor supply that involve implausibly large sup- 
ply elasticities-through a single device. This 
is the idea that, as a result of incentive prob- 
lems, equilibrium employment is determined 
not by the neoclassical labor supply curve 
(1.3), but instead by an alternative "equilib- 
rium wage curve," according to which the 
real wage that firms must pay to obtain a 
given labor input exceeds the reservation 
wage of unemployed workers. This makes 
possible an equilibrium with unemployment. 
At the same time, it makes possible an expla- 
nation of real wage rigidity-in the sense 
that a contraction of labor demand results in 
a contraction of equilibrium employment, 
rather than simply a reduction in the equilib- 
rium real wage to the extent required to 
maintain employment-that does not depend 
upon an assumption that household labor 
supply is extremely elastic near the equilib- 
rium level of real wages. This alternative view 
of labor market equilibrium is taken up in the 
next section. 
Phelps' theory also argues that labor de- 
mand can be affected by aggregate shocks in 
a variety of ways not allowed by the aggrega- 
tive neoclassical relation (1.2). In particular, 
he argues that interest rates and expectations 
regarding future business conditions should 
be important determinants of current labor 
demand, for a variety of reasons, but above 
all as a result of imperfect competition in the 
product market. Phelps' theory of firms' sup- 
ply behavior in the product market, given the 
labor costs determined by labor market con- 
ditions, is treated in Section 3. These two in- 
7 These objections apply mainly to the appeal of 
the hypothesis of techlnolo y shocks to expoain em- 
ployment fluctuations at business cycle frequen- 
cies; certainly lower-frequency variations in the 
rate of technical progress do occur and probably 
play an important role in explaining lower-fre- 
quency shifts in the path of employment. 
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novations, combined, yield a rich theory of 
the macroeconomic determinants of unem- 
ployment. 
2. Real Wage Rigidity and 
Unemployment 
Phelps' explanation of the existence of in- 
voluntary unemployment, and his way of rec- 
onciling "real wage rigidity" with an inelastic 
labor supply on the part of households, relies 
upon the now familiar idea of efficiency 
wages. The idea, of course, is that firms may 
care about the real wage that they pay, not 
only as a direct element of their costs, but 
also because of the incentive effects of the 
wage upon aspects of employee behavior that 
also affect the firm's costs, and that cannot be 
specified as terms of an enforceable contract. 
Hence firms may not wish to hire employees 
for the lowest wage that anyone would ac- 
cept; and as a result, unemployed workers 
may be unable to underbid the wages of em- 
ployed workers, even when the reservation 
wage of unemployed workers is lower than 
the wage paid to employed workers. 
He develops two alternative theories of this 
kind, one based on the use of a high real 
wage to induce employees to supply a higher 
level of effort (the "shirking" model), and one 
based on the use of a high real wage to re- 
duce turnover costs due to voluntary quits 
(the "quitting" model). The models in the 
present volume do not introduce especially 
novel types of incentive problems or funda- 
mentally new views of why unemployment 
should occur in equilibrium. The book's main 
contribution to efficiency wage theory con- 
sists, instead, in the integration of efficiency 
wages into a dynamic general equilibrium 
framework, so that the response to shocks 
can be analyzed at a level of sophistication 
comparable to that of the neoclassical litera- 
ture. 
2.1. The Equilibrium Wage Curve 
I will sketch here the structure of the un- 
employment model that is used most exten- 
sively in the book, Phelps' basic "shirking" 
model. Employees are assumed to be able to 
vary the effort with which they work, and a 
firm's output depends upon the effective la- 
bor input, taken to be the product of the 
number of employees N by each employee's 
effort e,8 through a production function of 
the form9 
Y = AF(K,eN) (2.1) 
Each employee of a given firm i is assumed 
furthermore to supply effort to an extent de- 
scribed by a supply function 
ei = E(Wi,We, u) (2.2) 
where wi is the real wage paid by firm i, we is 
the real wage that the workers expect they 
would receive if they were instead to find 
jobs at another firm, and u is the unemploy- 
ment rate in the labor market as a whole.10 
The function ? is assumed to be continuous, 
increasing in its first argument, decreasing in 
the second, and increasing in the third. Thus 
? depends not only upon the terms of em- 
ployment at firm i, but upon general labor 
market conditions as well (or, more precisely, 
upon workers' perceptions of these). 
One can imagine micro-foundations for 
such a behavioral relation of the following 
sort.11 One must suppose that effort cannot 
be continuously monitored, or else the incen- 
tive problem would not arise. Let us suppose 
however that an imperfect monitoring tech- 
nology exists, as in the explicit model of Carl 
Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz (1984), that pro- 
duces a signal indicating undesirable per- 
8If employees are heterogeneous, this must be 
expressed as an integral, but I will ignore such 
complications here. 
9 The length of the workweek is now assumed to 
be fixed, so that variations in employment N here 
are the sole source of variations in total man-hours. 
The specification (2.1) thus differs from (1.1) only 
in the allowance for variable effort. 
10The model develops an idea introduced into 
the modern literature by Samuel Bowles (1985), 
Guillermo A. Calvo (1979), and Robert M. Solow 
(1979). Phelps assumes that E also depends upon 
another variable, income from wealth, discussed 
below. Finally, he assumes (p. 31) that the vari- 
ables we and u enter only through the product (1 - 
U)we, but he admits (p. 22, footnote 7) that this is 
more convenient than correct. 
11 Phelps presents an explicit model of the deci- 
sion to supply effort in Chapter 15, although, be- 
cause worker heterogeneity is explicitly deaLt with, 
that model is more complex than the "basic" 
model presented in Section 3.2 and used in much 
of the book, and that I discuss here. 
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formance with a probability q(e) per unit 
time, which probability decreases the greater 
the employee's effort. Suppose also that the 
only penalty that a firm can impose upon re- 
ceipt of such a signal, in order to provide an 
incentive for effort, is to terminate the em- 
ployment of the employee in question; and 
that the firm's optimal policy is for it to com- 
mit itself to do so. Finally, suppose that the 
employee's disutility of effort (that is addi- 
tively separable from his utility from con- 
sumption) is incremented by a flow of d(e) 
per unit time, which quantity is increasing in 
the degree of effort. Then if one also sup- 
poses that q(e) and d(e) are both convex func- 
tions, an employee will choose the level of 
effort at each point in time such that 
-q'(e)Vi = d'(e) 
where Vi denotes the utility value attached to 
the state of employment at firm i, relative to 
the state of unemployment. At this point the 
marginal disutility of further effort comes to 
outweigh the marginal increment to expected 
utility that would result from the reduced 
probability of receiving a bad report. This re- 
lation implies that ei will be an increasing 
function of Vi. If the value Vi attached to em- 
ployment at firm i is increasing in wi, de- 
creasing in we, and increasing in u-as is 
demonstrated under the explicit assumptions 
of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model-one obtains a 
behavioral relation of the form (2.2). The 
variables we and u enter because they deter- 
mine the worker's expectations about his 
prospects should he become unemployed; we 
is the real wage that he expects to obtain 
once he finds a new job, and u determines 
the average length of time that he expects to 
be unemployed. 
I now turn to the consequences of (2.2) for 
labor market equilibrium. Given the produc- 
tion function (2.1) and an understanding of 
the behavioral rule (2.2), firm i minimizes its 
cost of producing a given quantity of output, 
not by paying the lowest real wage consistent 
with its being able to find workers, but rather 
by paying the wage that minimizes the cost of 
effective labor, w e (wi, we, u), given general 
labor market conditions. Let the solution to 
this problem be denoted wi = V(we, u). Then 
the equilibrium real wage, for any given level 
of employment N by the representative firm, 
is given by a function w = v*(N), indicating 




where L is the size of the total labor force. 
This gives a locus in the real wage-employ- 
ment plane, that Phelps calls the equilibrium 
wage curve.12 Labor market equilibrium must 
always be at some point on this locus, the ex- 
act point depending upon the determinants 
of labor demand. The wage curve thus plays 
the role in this theory that the labor demand 
curve does in the neoclassical theory, and for 
this reason Phelps also sometimes calls it the 
"surrogate labor supply curve."13 
Consider, for simplicity, the case of a com- 
petitive product market. In this case, the pro- 
duction function (2.1) implies that the real 
wage wi that would induce firm i to choose a 
level of employment Ni = N is given by 
wd(N) = A e*(N) FN(K, e*(N)N), (2.3) 
where the equilibrium effort function e*(N) is 
given by 
e*(N) = e (v*(N), v*(N),(L-N)/L). 
This demand wage relation clearly general- 
izes the neoclassical relation (1.2), to which it 
reduces in the case of constant effort. Labor 
market equilibrium is then a real wage and 
employment pair that jointly satisfy (2.2)- 
(2.3). The equilibrium will in general involve 
involuntary unemployment, insofar as N < L, 
despite the fact that all members of the labor 
force would prefer to be employed under 
the equilibrium terms of employment (for 
12 Note that it generalizes the "no shirking con- 
dition" locus of Shapiro and Stiglitz. Their equilib- 
rium is of the kind just described, except that ef- 
fort is a discrete variable, taking either a value of 
zero or of one. The optimal wage for an individual 
firm, V(We, u), is then simply the wage that just 
suffices to induce each employee to choose e = 1. 
13 He obtains similar conclusions for an alterna- 
tive efficiency wage model, in which firms' costs 
are affected by the rate at which employees volun- 
tarily quit. Insofar as the quit rate is a decreasing 
function of Vi, it should depend upon the same 
state variables as does effort in the specification 
(2.2), with similar consequences for the form of 
the equilibrium wage curve. 
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Vi>O). This state of affairs deserves to be 
called an "equilibrium," despite the failure of 
the labor market to clear, because each agent 
acts optimally, given a correct understanding 
of the actions of the others. In particular, 
each firm's choice of (wi, Ni) is a best re- 
sponse to the general labor market conditions 
(we, U), which are in turn exactly those that 
follow from the wage and employment deci- 
sions of each of the individual firms. 
The model is also capable of generating 
considerable "real wage rigidity" without hav- 
ing to rely upon voluntary reductions in labor 
force participation to explain it. For the wage 
curve may be relatively flat in the region of 
the equilibrium. This simply requires that the 
amount of time that workers expect to spend 
in the pool of unemployed workers, were 
they to become unemployed, not depend in 
too sensitive a way upqn the current unem- 
ployment rate. In such a case, an adverse 
shift in labor demand, due perhaps to a re- 
duction in the technology factor A, or to an 
increase in payroll taxes or other costs of em- 
ployment, should result in a shift of equilib- 
rium down and to the left on the wage curve, 
as shown in the figure. This may involve a 
substantial reduction in equilibrium employ- 
ment and only a modest decline in the equi- 
librium real wage. And this may occur despite 
a neoclassical labor supply that is completely 
inelastic over the relevant range of variation 
in conditions of employment, insofar as one 
continues to have Vi > 0 over this entire 
range. 
So much is by now standard fare, at least in 
the recent literature concerned with the the- 
ory of unemployment,'4 though it is ex- 
pounded here in an especially scrupulous 
way. The book's most important innovation, 
apart from the incorporation of this model of 
the labor market into a complete general 
equilibrium model, is in its allowance for 
wealth effects on the location of the equilib- 
rium wage curve. We have seen above that 
wealth effects on labor supply play a crucial 
role in the neoclassical theory; but as Phelps 
argues, similar effects should be no less im- 
portant in the determination of equilibrium 
employment, even if the equilibrium involves 
involuntary unemployment. A theory of the 
kind sketched above, assuming that the effort 
supply function in (2.2) does not depend 
upon any other state variables, has the unfor- 
tunate feature that it predicts that long-run 
technical progress (and, one might add, 
growth of the capital stock per worker as 
well), by continually shifting the demand 
wage relation up and to the right, should re- 
sult in a permanently falling unemployment 
rate, as the equilibrium progresses up the 
fixed wage curve. But this is not observed; 
instead, one observes little secular trend in 
unemployment rates, despite significant 
trend growth in real wages and in output per 
worker. 
Phelps deals with this by supposing that ef- 
fort supplied also depends upon a variable yw 
representing income from wealth (or more 
generally, income in addition to wage in- 
come). In general, he assumes more specifi- 
cally that effort supply is given by 
ei = E(wi/yw,we/yw,u) 
This implies a wage curve of the form 
w = ywv*(N). (2.4) 
(Note that the derivation of the equilib- 
rium effort function and of (2.3) is unaffected 
by this modification.) Then if income from 
wealth grows in the long run in the same pro- 
portion as does the marginal product of labor, 
the demand wage (2.3) and the "supply wage" 
(2.4) shift up, at each possible level of em- 
ployment, in exactly the same proportion, so 
that the equilibrium unemployment rate is 
unchanged. This is surely the most appealing 
answer to the puzzle of the absence of a secu- 
lar trend in unemployment rates.15 
14 See, e.g., Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell, 
and Richard Jackman (1991) and Assar Lindbeck 
(1993) for discussion of a broad family of unem- 
ployment theories with a similar structure. These 
authors refer to the equilibrium wage curve as the 
"wage-setting curve," and discuss a variety of rea- 
sons why it may lie above and to the left of the 
neoclassical labor supply curve. David Blanch- 
flower and Andrew Oswald (forthcoming) discuss 
a variety of studies that find an inverse relation 
between wages and the regional unemployment 
rate, of the kind predicted by these theories. 
15 Lindbeck (1993) proposes instead that the 
productivity factor A should be included as an ar- 
gument of the "wage setting curve," so that this 
curve shifts up with technical progress through a 
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The wealth effect on effort supply (or simi- 
larly, on quit rates in Phelps' alternative 
model) makes sense, for the real wage affects 
effort supply through its effect on Vi, the util- 
ity value of retaining employment at firm i, 
but it is the utility value of the wage, and not 
its real value in terms of goods as such, that 
enters this calculation. Hence one should ex- 
pect the equilibrium wage function to be 
multiplied by a factor inversely proportional 
to the marginal utility of income.' Insofar as it 
is reasonable for this marginal utility to be 
decreasing in household wealth, it makes 
sense that the function should be multiplied 
by a factor that is an increasing function of 
wealth. Shapiro and Stiglitz fail to obtain an 
expression involving such a factor, because 
they assume that utility is linear in consump- 
tion (or, as they equivalently assume, in the 
real wage); thus in their case, the marginal 
utility of income is not affected by the level 
of household wealth. But while this is theo- 
retically possible (and analytically conve- 
nient), it represents a limiting case, and has 
the undesirable prediction about the effects 
of long-run technical progress mentioned 
above. Phelps' assumption that increased 
household wealth shifts up the wage curve is 
thus more realistic.16 
2.2. Theoretical Objections 
It must nonetheless be remarked that 
Phelps' wage curve (2.4) can be regarded 
only as an approximation to the more com- 
plete account that the literature has yet to 
provide. First of all, as the preceding discus- 
sion should make clear, the factor by which 
the equilibrium wage should be scaled is re- 
ally something like the marginal utility of in- 
come of the representative household-i.e., 
the factor X that shifts the neoclassical labor 
supply curve (1.3). This is related to the 
amount of non-wage income that the house- 
hold has, but not in a simple way. In particu- 
lar, if either wage income or non-wage in- 
come is expected to vary over time, it is not 
the amount of additional income that a 
worker currently receives that determines the 
marginal utility associated with a certain real 
wage; rather, it is the capitalized value of all 
of the contributions to the worker's lifetime 
budget, other than current wage income. In 
the special case that both real wage income 
and real non-wage income are constant over 
time, the relation between employment, the 
real wage, and total wealth reduces to a rela- 
tion between employment, the real wage, and 
the level of real non-wage income; thus 
Phelps' conclusions are valid in the case of 
long-run steady states. 
But the distinction matters for the analysis 
of the transitory responses to shocks.ll In 
particular, recognition that X rather than yw 
is what shifts the wage curve would introduce 
all of the channels through which temporary 
government purchases affect equilibrium em- 
ployment and output in the neoclassical 
model: the expectation of future tax increases 
would have a wealth effect, even if there 
were no immediate reduction in non-wage in- 
come, and an increase in real interest rates 
would have an intertemporal substitution ef- 
fect, even if real non-wage income at all dates 
were unchanged. The casual treatment of this 
issue is somewhat surprising, given that the 
effects of real interest rates on employment is 
one of the book's main themes. 
Of course, the empirical importance of 
more direct effect. But such a direct effect of 
technology on the wages that firms must pay to 
obtain workers of the kind that they desire re- 
quires much more special assumptions than does 
the wealth effect emphasized by Phelps -it clearly 
makes no sense in the case of an efficiency wage 
model, and such an effect is also absent in some 
models of union wage bargaining as well, such as 
the model of Ian McDonald and Solow (1981). 
And if one grants the reasonableness of the wealth 
effect, a direct effect of productivity on wage-set- 
tingis not needed. 
16Such an effect should also plausibly exist in 
models of union wage bargaining like that of 
McDonald and Solow. For the union's optimal 
wage demand depends upon a comparison of the 
extent to which higher wages wouId add to the 
utility of the employed members to the size of 
the utility loss associated with employment, and 
the first term of the comparison should depend 
upon the level of household wealth. 
17 In fact, it will still not matter in the case of a 
permanent shock, if the model implies an immedi- 
ate jump to the new long run steady state, as is 
true for some of Phelps' models. This is true, how- 
ever, only because these models abstract from a 
great many factors of practical importance, such as 
capital accumulation. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.154.119 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 13:52:15 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Woodford: Structural Slumps 1795 
such effects may be doubted;18 and so per- 
haps Phelps does not go far astray in omitting 
them. Yet a modification of the analysis so as 
to explain why they should be unimportant 
may have important consequences for other 
aspects of his model. As mentioned earlier, 
intertemporal substitution effects should not 
be important if workers are liquidity-con- 
strained; and indeed a possible interpretation 
of Phelps' specification (2.4) is that it as- 
sumes implicitly that workers are liquidity- 
constrained, so that current consumption 
(and hence the current marginal utility of in- 
come) depends solely upon the current real 
wage, employment status, and current non- 
wage income, through a budget constraint of 
the form (1.5). But this would be inconsistent 
with other aspects of Phelps' general equilib- 
rium analysis, in which real interest rates 
(that matter for labor demand, for reasons 
discussed in the next section) are related to 
household consumption/saving decisions in a 
way that indicates an assumption of friction- 
less financial markets. 
Furthermore, Phelps assumes (see equa- 
tion (3.1) below) that yw corresponds to the 
current profits of firms. Yet this makes sense 
only if the workers own the firms, if all earn- 
ings are immediately distributed to share- 
holders, and shares in the firms are not trade- 
able (so that the capitalized value of future 
profits does not augment a worker's current 
budget). Thus a simple inability to borrow 
against future wages would not itself justify 
the specification that is adopted. 
Another analytical complication that is 
side-stepped in the derivation of (2.4) con- 
cerns worker heterogeneity. If effort supply 
depends upon wealth, then it will not be the 
same for all workers if their wealths differ, 
and in fact it is almost unavoidable, in a 
model with unemployment (so that all house- 
holds do not receive the same wage income at 
a given point in time, even if there is a single 
wage for all employed workers), that one 
should have a nondegenerate distribution ol 
wealth levels across workers. Phelps ad- 
dresses this issue in the explicit model of the 
effort decision that he presents in Chapter 
15; here it is assumed that firms cannot ob- 
serve the wealth of job applicants, so that 
each firm's hires represent a typical cross- 
section of the overall wealth distribution of 
the population, and the distribution of levels 
of effort that are elicited by a given real wage 
is determined accordingly. But the analysis is 
not carried through to the point of actually 
presenting a complete general equilibrium 
model, even of a long-run steady state. In 
more recent work (Phelps 1994a) the author 
has presented a general equilibrium model, 
along somewhat different lines, but still does 
not attempt to analyze transition dynamics 
taking explicit account of the evolution of the 
wealth distribution. This is an important re- 
spect in which the theory remains to be com- 
pleted. 
But the issue of aggregation is not the only 
problem with the use of (2.4) to determine 
equilibrium employment outside of a steady 
state. In my discussion of micro-foundations 
for (2.2), I implicitly assumed that wi, we, and 
u were all expected to remain constant, as is 
explicit in the model of Shapiro and Stiglitz. 
Thus the derivation of (2.4) makes sense if 
one is characterizing labor market equilib- 
rium in a steady state. But in the case of a 
nonstationary equilibrium, Vi should depend 
not just upon the current real wages and un- 
employment, but also upon their expected fu- 
ture paths. Thus the equilibrium wage curve 
should depend upon expectations of future 
labor market conditions, and not only be- 
cause the marginal utility of income X de- 
pends upon expected future income; indeed, 
even in the case of liquidity-constrained 
workers, in which case X does not depend 
upon expectations about the future, Vi will 
nonetheless depend upon expectations (inso- 
far as current employment status affects fu- 
ture employment prospects). As a conse- 
quence, one cannot expect the equilibrium 
wage to be a simple function of the current 
level of employment, even abstracting from 
18 But note that one cannot dismiss them simply 
on the ground that one does not believe that peo- 
ple vary the length of their desired workweek in 
response to interest rate changes; for the effects 
should exist even if desired labor supply is com- 
pletely inelastic, as long as intertemporal subsitu- 
tion of consumption is possible. See the insightful 
discussion of the effects of government spending 
in an efficiency wage model by Pierre Picard 
(1993, ch. 7). 
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the consequences of variations in the mar- 
ginal utility of income.19 
Nor do the complications end with the sim- 
ple introduction of additional expectational 
variables as arguments of the equilibrium 
wage curve. For one also must recognize that, 
in the discussion above of the micro-founda- 
tions of effort supply, the role of the real 
wage wi as an incentive depends upon the 
firm committing itself to pay this real wage 
for a period of time. For if the firm optimally 
chooses a new wage for its employees at each 
point in time, without commitment, then it 
cannot expect that its choice of wi at the 
present instant can have any effect upon its 
employees' current effort decisions; these 
will depend (as Vi depends) purely upon the 
employees' expectations about the level of 
wages that the firm will choose subsequently, 
which are whatever it will be optimal for the 
firm to choose then. But if the current choice 
of ei is unaffected by the current value of wi, 
then firm i minimizes the current cost of 
effective labor (without in any way increas- 
ing its future costs) by setting wi as low as 
possible, so that an equilibrium with a wage 
higher than the reservation wage of the un- 
employed (and an effort level higher than the 
lowest possible one) would not seem to be 
possible. 
Thus the model must instead be inter- 
preted as one in which firm i chooses a wage 
commitment to pay for a period of time, tak- 
ing into account the effort that this wage will 
induce over the life of the contract.20 (The 
issue is not explicitly discussed by Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, who assume a stationary equilib- 
rium, and treat the firm's choice of its wage 
as a once-and-for-all decision.) This further 
complicates a correct description of nonsta- 
tionary equilibrium dynamics. In particular, 
the set of prior wage commitments that are 
still in force at any point in time represent 
predetermined state variables in the determi- 
nation of the current equilibrium. In Phelps' 
analysis, by contrast, "the" real wage is re- 
garded as a state variable that can respond 
instantaneously to current information. In 
those models in which there is no capital 
stock state variable, he therefore concludes 
that the economy can jump immediately to 
the new steady state equilibrium, in response 
to a permanent shock. But if the efficiency 
wage represents a wage commitment, then 
the adjustment to a permanent shock will 
take time due to the existence of wage com- 
mitments that continue to apply for some 
time. 
2.3. Consequences of the Theory 
One must therefore conclude that the 
analysis of equilibrium dynamics, including 
the analysis of the transitory effects of perma- 
nent shocks or policy changes, remains quite 
incomplete. Nonetheless, Phelps' bold sim- 
plification, in positing a wage curve of the 
form (2.4), surely yields many general in- 
sights about the determination of equilibrium 
unemployment that are likely to continue to 
be valid in a more complete analysis. One of 
these, emphasized already, is that significant 
real wage rigidity is possible even when de- 
sired household labor supply is quite inelas- 
tic. Another concerns the welfare analysis of 
variations in employment. The neoclassical 
model of the previous section implies that, 
when one abstracts from the effects of dis- 
torting taxes, the equilibrium level of employ- 
ment is also the efficient one; bringing about 
higher equilibrium employment, for example 
through employment subsidies, would lower 
the welfare of the representative household, 
insofar as the additional hours worked at the 
margin would cause a disutility greater than 
the utility increase resulting from consump- 
tion of the increased output. 
In an efficiency wage model of the kind 
sketched above, by contrast, in the absence of 
distorting taxes, the equilibrium level of un- 
employment is inefficiently high. The fact 
that at the equilibrium level of employment 
the demand wage exceeds the reservation 
19 See, e.g., Alan Manning (1990, Appendix) 
and Miles Kimball (1993) for discussions of equi- 
librium dynamics in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, in 
which, as noted above, the marginal utility of in- 
come is assumed to be constant. Manning argues 
that a dynamic wage-setting relation can help to 
explain the permanent increase in unemployment 
rates in many OECD countries since 1970, by link- 
ing it to the slowdown in real wage growth due to 
the productivity slowdown. 
2This argument and its consequences are de- 
veloped more fully in Woodford (1994). 
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wage at which additional persons would be 
willing to work means that a subsidy that in- 
creases equilibrium employment should' in- 
crease welfare, even in the case of perfect 
insurance of employment risk, if the subsidy 
can be financed in a way that does not create 
other distortions with too large a cost.21 (In 
the more realistic case of incomplete insur- 
ance, the social desirability of increased em- 
ployment can be even greater, taking into ac- 
count the distributional consequences as 
well.) 
Phelps' analysis also provides many impor- 
tant insights into the kinds of factors that 
should have important effects upon equilib- 
rium employment. In many respects, the con- 
clusions obtained are quite similar to those 
implied by the neoclassical model, in the case 
of an assumption of relatively elastic house- 
hold labor supply-it is simply the welfare 
implications that are different, and the fact 
that one does not need to assume an elastic 
labor supply to obtain the results. This is 
worth stressing, because commentators often 
discuss efficiency wage theories of the labor 
market as if they are "Keynesian" theories, 
simply because the labor market does not 
clear. But the structure of the theory is in 
fact much more reminiscent of the neoclassi- 
cal theory than of Keynesian theory. 
First of all, as Lindbeck (1993) stresses, in 
this model, like the neoclassical model, "equi- 
librium is determined in the labor market, 
rather than in the product market." The fac- 
tors that determine the locations of the wage 
curve and the demand wage relation suffice 
to determine equilibrium employment and 
hence equilibrium output as well, at any 
given point in time; factors affecting aggre- 
gate product demand thus play no role in de- 
termining equilibrium output, except insofar 
as they also affect supply or demand in the 
labor market (as in Barro's analysis of the ef- 
fects of government purchases). This result 
contrasts sharply with Keynesian theory, and 
is due to the fact that the wage curve (2.4) 
provides a second relation between the equi- 
librium real wage and employment, in addi- 
tion to that implied by labor demand. In 
Keynesian theory, by contrast, relation (2.3) 
is combined with a predetermined nominal 
wage; as a result of which the price level (de- 
termined in the product market) also matters 
for employment determination. 
This same feature of the theory explains 
why monetary factors need have no essential 
role in output and employment determina- 
tion-as is shown by the fact that Phelps de- 
velops complete general equilibrium models 
that are entirely nonmonetary. It is probably 
for this reason that Phelps seeks to explain 
the large swings in unemployment from de- 
cade to decade entirely in nonmonetary 
terms. The focus upon the labor market, as 
opposed to the product market, does not 
mean that Phelps assigns no importance to 
changes in aggregate demand; but, as is dis- 
cussed further below, the way in which these 
factors matter in his model is often quite 
non-Keynesian, even if his qualitative conclu- 
sions sometimes agree with traditional 
Keynesian analyses. 
Phelps' theory is also reminiscent of neo- 
classical theory in the role assigned to wealth 
effects. In neoclassical theory, wealth effects 
play an important role in employment and 
output determination (as discussed in the 
previous section), but solely through their 
consequences for labor supply-as a result of 
which increases in perceived household 
wealth are contractionary; in Keynesian the- 
ory, by contrast, wealth effects are also often 
supposed to be important, but solely through 
their consequences for aggregate demand- 
as a result of which increases in perceived 
household wealth are expansionary. In 
Phelps' theory, increases in household wealth 
are contractionary, and the reason is closely 
related to the neoclassical analysis: increased 
wealth shifts up the wage curve, because the 
incentive effects of wages on households is 
diluted when the households are wealthier. 
This is one reason why, in Phelps' analysis, 
higher levels of government debt are argued 
to increase unemployment-a factor to which 
he attributes some importance in his analysis 
of the general increase in unemployment in 
the OECD countries over the past two de- 
21 This is not, of course, a necessary conclusion 
in models of equilibrium unemployment; for ex- 
ample, in models where time spent in job search 
increases the desirability of the matches eventu- 
ally obtained, it is possible for equilibrium unem- 
ployment to be too low. 
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cades.22 In Keynesian theory, it is usually 
supposed that the wealth effect on labor sup- 
ply can be ignored, both because it is often 
supposed to be insignificant empirically, and 
because it is assumed that if equilibrium is 
"off the labor supply curve" due to job ration- 
ing, shifts in the location of that curve do not 
affect employment in any event. But Phelps' 
general equilibrium analysis shows that nei- 
ther argument need be valid, because the 
wage curve may be shifted for similar rea- 
sons, even when it lies to the left of the neo- 
classical labor supply curve, and even when 
the latter is not shifted left by an increase in 
household wealth. 
His theory is equally reminiscent of neo- 
classical theory in the role assigned to payroll 
taxes and taxes on labor income as factors 
that reduce equilibrium employment. Be- 
cause the wage curve (2.4), like the neoclassi- 
cal labor supply curve, relates the after-tax 
wage received by households to the level of 
employment, while the demand wage relation 
(2.3) refers to the cost of labor to the firm, 
payroll taxes or taxes on wage income drive a 
wedge between these two curves, reducing 
equilibrium employment. Phelps gives con- 
siderable emphasis to recent increases in 
taxes and other labor costs in explaining the 
increased levels of unemployment over the 
past two decades, and in explaining the 
greater increase in unemployment in Europe 
than in the United States. The efficiency 
wage model implies that these effects can be 
significant, even in the case of perfectly in- 
elastic labor supply, and even when unem- 
ployment is not voluntary. Keynesian models, 
of course, also emphasize the contractionary 
effects of tax increases, but through quite a 
different channel, namely through a reduc- 
tion in aggregate demand due to lower pri- 
vate incomes. Among other things, Keynesian 
theory suggests that an increase in the size of 
the welfare state-financing an increase in 
transfers through an increase in taxes on 
wage income-should not be contractionary, 
while Phelps' theory, like the neoclassical 
theory, implies that it should be. 
The efficiency wage theory does however 
lead to different conclusions from the neo- 
classical theory when finer aspects of tax pol- 
icy are considered. For example, Barro 
(1989) emphasizes that in neoclassical theory, 
it is the marginal tax rate that determines 
the effect of taxes on real activity, and even 
argues that the shift in U.S. tax policy in the 
1980s to a greater share of government reve- 
nues coming from the social security tax 
should have increased equilibrium employ- 
ment and output, due to the less progressive 
nature of the social security tax by compari- 
son with the income tax. But this emphasis on 
the marginal tax rate is correct only if the 
cost of labor to firms, at a given overall level 
of production, is determined by the after-tax 
wage that just induces each household to be 
indifferent between working more or less. In 
the efficiency wage model, the cost of labor 
to firms is instead determined by the after-tax 
wage that makes each employed worker suffi- 
ciently reluctant to lose his job, and this con- 
sideration depends upon the total after-tax 
wages of an employed worker, not upon the 
rate at which those wages would increase in 
the case of a longer workweek. Thus it is the 
average tax rate on labor income that matters 
for aggregate supply in such a model; and it is 
hard to see how this could be reduced by a 
shift in revenue sources from the income tax 
to the social security tax. 
Phelps' theory also implies that generous 
unemployment benefits should increase equi- 
librium unemployment. It might be thought 
that unemployment benefits should increase 
unemployment only insofar as it is a volun- 
tary decision-that, if the demand wage is al- 
ready well above the reservation wage of the 
unemployed, an increase in the reservation 
wage of the unemployed (because they would 
lose unemployment benefits were they to 
take a job) should not increase unemploy- 
ment. But the efficiency wage model implies 
that the wage curve should also be shifted up 
by an increase in unemployment benefits, re- 
ducing equilibrium -employment. For wi and 
we both affect the value of Vi only through 
22 Government bonds add to net private sector 
wealth in Phelps' analysis, contrary to the "Ri- 
cardian" result that is common in neoclassical 
analyses, because Phelps does not assume a repre- 
sentative household. Throughout the book, he as- 
sumes overlapping generations of households with 
stochastic lifetimes, adopting the device intro- 
duced by Olivier Blanchard (1985). 
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the differential between the wages received 
by employed and unemployed workers. If un- 
employed workers receive benefits with real 
value B, it follows that Vi, and hence ei, 
should in fact be increasing in wi - B and 
decreasing in we - B, with the consequence 
that the equilibrium wage is increased by B at 
each level of employment. Unemployment 
benefits increase the real wage that firms 
must pay in order to induce a given level of 
effort, because they reduce the cost that 
workers expect to bear if they lose their cur- 
rent job. If firms are competitive, so that the 
demand wage relation is of the form (2.3), 
there is furthermore no channel through 
which the stimulus to aggregate demand that 
might be expected to result from such bene- 
fits can have any effect upon employment de- 
termination, so that the ultimate general 
equilibrium effect is increased unemploy- 
ment.23 
Not only does Phelps' theory confirm the 
qualitative conclusion of the simple neoclassi- 
cal theory (that treats such benefits as a sub- 
sidy to leisure), but it sharpens it in an impor- 
tant respect. Arguments that unemployment 
benefits increase unemployment because they 
increase the reservation wage of unemployed 
workers suggest that the problem could in 
principle be eliminated if the program is 
"strictly administered"; that is, that no prob- 
lem would exist if benefit recipients were re- 
quired to seek employment and to accept any 
opportunities that come their way. But the 
efficiency wage theory implies that the bene- 
fits will reduce equilibrium employment even 
in this case, for they will still diminish em- 
ployed workers' concern about losing their 
jobs. 
Phelps' theory thus gives considerable em- 
phasis to the deleterious "supply-side" effects 
of a number of features of the modern wel- 
fare state, that in Keynesian theory are ar- 
gued to be benign, if not actually expansion- 
ary, in their effects on employment. This 
does not, however, mean that he argues for 
the desirability of an unregulated market sys- 
tem. As noted above, his theory implies that 
under laissez faire equilibrium unemploy- 
ment should be too high. But he proposes 
that the appropriate response is to subsidize 
the employment of low-wage workers, rather 
than offering generous unemployment bene- 
fits and other kinds of transfers independent 
of work status. Indeed, he argues eloquently 
for a reorientation of social policy, from the 
welfare state to "programs for economic jus- 
tice," by which he means a concern to ensure 
a fair wage even for workers with low skills 
(pp. 373-74). (For further discussion see 
Phelps 1994b.) 
3. Expectations and Interest Rates as 
Determinants of Labor Demand 
While the efficiency wage model can ex- 
plain the existence of a relatively elastic equi- 
librium wage schedule, without having to at- 
tribute it to elastic household labor supply, 
this does not in itself resolve a crucial diffi- 
culty of the neoclassical theory discussed 
above-the fact that there is relatively little 
role for macroeconomic shocks as a source of 
variations in equilibrium employment in that 
theory. Note that in the model of the pre- 
vious section, the current level of income 
from wealth should be given by 
yw = AF(K,e*(N)N) - wN. (3.1) 
The system (2.3)-(2.4) and (3.1) then de- 
termines the equilibrium level of employ- 
ment N, given the state of productivity A and 
the current capital stock K. These equations 
have been written for the case of no taxes or 
government transfers, and as argued above, 
payroll taxes, taxes on labor income, and un- 
employment benefits should all affect equi- 
librium employment, and probably play sig- 
nificant roles in explaining phenomena such 
as the increase in European unemployment 
in the 1980s. 
But it should be observed that there is no 
role whatsoever in this system for shocks to 
aggregate demand (such as changes in the 
level of government purchases, changes in 
private attitudes toward saving, or changes in 
the attractiveness of investment opportuni- 
ties) to play in employment determination, at 
least in the short run (before they can have a 
23A similar conclusion results from a variet of 
models of equilibrium unemployment, incluTing 
union bargaining models. See, e.g., Lindbeck 
(1993). 
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significant effect upon the capital stock or 
upon endogenous technical progress) and in- 
sofar as they are not associated with changes 
in the current level of taxes or transfers.24 
Perhaps more surprisingly, shifts in the pro- 
ductivity factor A have no effect upon equi- 
librium employment in this system either; 
they simply result in proportional shifts in the 
real wage.25 Thus insofar as the effects of ex- 
ogenous changes in the price of oil imports 
are treated as similar to an exogenous change 
in the productivity factor A in (2.1), the 
model cannot explain the employment effects 
of the oil shocks of the 1970s-despite the 
presence of "real wage rigidity" at any given 
level of non-wage income. 
These results would be less extreme if one 
modeled the income effects upon the equilib- 
rium wage curve in the way that I have sug- 
gested above, i.e., if the shift variable in (2.4) 
were something like the current marginal 
utility of income rather than the current level 
of non-wage income. In this case, aggregate 
demand shocks could affect equilibrium em- 
ployment through intertemporal substitution 
effects, just as in the neoclassical theory. An 
exogenous productivity decline could reduce 
equilibrium employment temporarily, due to 
intertemporal substitution effects, again as in 
the neoclassical theory. However, as dis- 
cussed above, such heavy reliance upon in- 
tertemporal substitution by the suppliers of 
labor is somewhat uncomfortable. And our 
other criticisms of the neoclassical theory 
continue to be valid as well. A theory of the 
effects upon private employment of govern- 
ment purchases as due to a shift in the wage 
curve (due to a change in X) requires that 
real wages fall during a wartime boom. And a 
theory of the effects of an oil shock that relies 
upon the reduction in the demand wage that 
occurs due to the increased contribution of 
energy costs to marginal cost cannot explain 
the size of the reduction in the demand wage 
relation that seems to have accompanied the 
oil shocks of the 1970s. 
Phelps takes a different approach to ex- 
plaining how aggregate shocks other than 
current tax changes can affect equilibrium 
employment (and, indeed, ignores the in- 
tertemporal substitution effects just men- 
tioned). His argument is that the demand 
wage, as a function of the level of employ- 
ment, may depend upon many factors other 
than the capital stock and the current state of 
technology. He presents three distinct theo- 
ries in which this is so, discussed in separate 
chapters of the book: a theory of "customer 
markets," a theory of dynamic labor demand 
with costs of training, and a two-sector model 
in which there are separate technologies for 
producing consumption and capital goods. 
He stresses, however, the broad similarities 
between these different theories, and sug- 
gests that they complement rather than con- 
tradict one another. I will discuss the "cus- 
tomer market" theory in most detail, as it is 
the variant that is most distinctive to Phelps' 
thought, and the one that is referred to most 
consistently in his interpretation of the em- 
pirical record. 
3.1. Customer Markets and Labor 
Demand 
Phelps' customer market theory is an exam- 
ple of a broad class of explanations of shifts in 
labor demand as due to changes in the way 
that firms set prices relative to their marginal 
costs of production.26 I will illustrate this 
idea in the context of an efficiency-wage 
model of the labor market like that set out 
above, although the basic point is completely 
independent of that view of labor market 
equilibrium. In the analysis above, the equi- 
librium wage that each firm will choose to 
pay can be determined independently of the 
firm's decision about how many workers to 
hire, how much to produce, or how to price 
24This feature of simple models of equilibrium 
unemployment is clearfy discussed in Lindbeck 
(1993, ch. 6). 
25Well-known accounts, such as that of Sha p iro 
and Stiglitz, present the increase of unemploy- 
ment in response to an exogenous decline in labor 
productivity as a central result of efficiency wage 
theory. But this result is obtained in such analyses 
only through neglect of income effects, with the 
unfortunate implications regarding the conse- 
quences of secular productivity growth noted 
above. 
26 For surveys of a range of proposals of this 
kind, see Stiglitz (1984), Blanchard and Stanley 
Fischer (1989, sec. 9.5), and Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1992a). 
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its product. For relation (2.4) depends upon 
no aspect of the problem of firm i other than 
the fact that it wishes to minimize the cost 
wie of effective labor inputs, and the real 
wage wi that achieves this is independent of 
firm i's employment decision (though it de- 
pends upon the general level of employment 
N). The general price level P, with which the 
employees of firm i deflate their wages to de- 
termine their real value, is likewise inde- 
pendent of the pricing decision of firm i; and 
thus the nominal wage W that each firm 
chooses to pay can be determined inde- 
pendently of that firm's production, hiring, or 
pricing decisions. The effort level e of each 
firm's workers is similarly determined inde- 
pendently of the individual firm's supply de- 
cision. We can thus take W and e as given in 
considering the firm's supply decision, just as 
in the neoclassical model, with exogenous ef- 
fort and wage-taking firms. 
Given a production function of the form 
(2.1), each firm's (nominal) marginal cost of 
production Ci is given by 
= w 
AeFN(Ki, eNt) 
where (Ki, Ni) represent the factors employed 
by firm i. If the firm's product market is com- 
petitive, it produces to a point at which its 
marginal cost equals the price at which it can 
sell its product, so that Pi = Ci. This condi- 
tion, in the case of a symmetric equilibrium 
(in which prices and factor demands are the 
same for each firm) then implies (2.3). 
Suppose instead that the firm has market 
power in its product market. In this case, it 
can choose its own supply price Pi, and in 
general will maximize profits by choosing to 
maintain its price higher than its marginal 
cost of production. Suppose that the firm's 
desired markup at a given point in time is gt* 
(I shall discuss factors that determine this 
shortly.) Then its supply behavior is such that 
pi= PiCi. In a symmetric equilibrium, the 
general price level P (that determines the 
nominal wage corresponding the equilibrium 
real wage defined by (2.4)) is equal to the Pi 
chosen in this way by each firm, and the ag- 
gregate level of employment N (that affects 
each firm's production costs through its ef- 
fects upon effort supply) is equal to the Ni 
chosen in this way by each firm. The real 
wage then must equal the demand wage 
given by 
wd(N) = g-1 A e*(N) FN(K, e*(N)N). (3.2) 
This demand wage relation generalizes 
(2.3).27 Given the desired markup g, equilib- 
rium employment is then determined by the 
system (2.4) and (3.1)-(3.2). A higher desired 
markup lowers the demand wage at each pos- 
sible level of aggregate employment, and as a 
result should generally reduce the equilib- 
rium level of employment and output, for any 
given capital stock. 
The mere introduction of market power 
does not necessarily change any of our above 
conclusions about the inability of aggregate 
shocks to affect equilibrium employment; if g 
is simply an exogenous parameter-deter- 
mined, let us say, by the constant elasticity of 
demand for each of the differentiated goods 
in a Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic com- 
petition-unaffected by these shocks, then 
they continue to have no effect, by the same 
argument as before.28 The problem is re- 
solved only if the markup varies endo- 
genously in response to macroeconomic 
shocks. It should also be noted that it is not 
enough to suppose that the markup varies en- 
dogenously, but as a direct function of the 
current level of output (for example, because 
market power varies with the number of 
firms per industry, and the equilibrium num- 
ber of firms varies directly with the current 
level of overall demand). For if the markup is 
given by some function j(Y), then one need 
only substitute this into (3.2) in order to 
27 Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) call this 
the "price-setting equation" to emphasize the fact 
that, unlike the neoclassical relation (1.2), it can- 
not be interpreted as the quantity decision of a 
price-taking firm. In their interpretation, (3.2) in- 
dicates determination of the real wage by the 
prices that firms set, given their wage costs, while 
(2.4) indicates determination of the real wage by 
the wages that workers require given the prices 
that they must pay for consumption goods. In 
equilibrium, of course, the same real wage must 
satisfy both relations. 
28 It does, however, become possible to con- 
sider exogenous changes in the degree of market 
power as another possible type of macroeconomic 
shock, as discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1993). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.154.119 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 13:52:15 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1802 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXII (December 1994) 
again have a system of three equations to de- 
termine N, w, and yw given the current capi- 
tal stock. The type of theory that is needed is 
one in which the markup is "counter-cycli- 
cal"-but because variations in the desired 
markup cause variations in equilibrium out- 
put of the opposite sign, not because of a 
causal effect of the current level of demand 
on the desired markup. 
Through what channels, then, might aggre- 
gate conditions affect the desired markup? 
Phelps discusses two. The most familiar 
(though less emphasized in this book) is 
through the effect of foreign competition on 
domestic firms' market power. An increase in 
the relative price of foreign goods (due, for 
example, to a real depreciation of a country's 
currency) arguably increases the market 
power of each domestic firm, and can result 
in an equilibrium in which ,u is higher for all 
domestic firms.29 Phelps argues as a result 
that protective tariffs should reduce domestic 
employment and output, due to the increased 
markups that result from reduced competi- 
tion from foreign producers, acting to con- 
tract aggregate supply. This is in striking con- 
trast with the conclusion of the Keynesian 
analysis, that stresses the stimulus to domes- 
tic aggregate demand that should result from 
making imports less attractive. 
The channel to which Phelps gives the 
most attention follows from the "customer 
market" model of Phelps and Sidney Winter 
(1970). The idea is that firms have market 
power not because the goods they sell are 
genuinely imperfect substitutes for those sold 
by others, but because buyers have incom- 
plete information about the prices available 
from alternative suppliers. As a result, a firm 
that charges a higher price than its competi- 
tors will not lose too many sales immediately. 
But if it persists in charging a higher price it 
will constantly lose customers over time, as 
additional customers learn of the cheaper al- 
ternatives, and in the long run its sales will 
approach zero. Phelps models this dynamic 
demand by supposing that at each point in 
time, the sales yi of firm i per customer are 
given by 
y=Dt (3.3a) 
where Y is an index of aggregate demand and. 
D is a positive, decreasing function. Total 
sales at that point in time are then given by 
yi xi, where xi is the current size of the firm's 
stock of customers, a predetermined state 
variable that reflects the consequences of the 
firm's past pricing policy. The function D 
thus indicates the extent to which buyers sub- 
stitute away from purchases of the firm's 
product even if they do not switch to another 
supplier. The firm's stock of customers is as- 
sumed to evolve in response to price differ- 
entials, according to a dynamic equation of 
the form 
x = hiLl (3.3b) 
where h is a descreasing function with h(1)= 
0. This is a simple specification that ensures 
that if all firms charge the same price (as they 
are assumed to do in equilibrium) their mar- 
ket shares are stable, while if a firm charges a 
higher price than others forever, it will even- 
tually lose all of its customers. Equations 
(3.3a)-(3.3b) together specify the dynamic re- 
sponse of demand to the firm's pricing policy. 
In such a model, a firm's optimal supply 
policy is to choose Pi at each point in time to 
maximize 
Y(D ' + q h J 
where q represents the addition that an addi- 
tional customer makes to the present dis- 
counted value of the firm's expected profits 
over the indefinite future. Phelps assumes 
that marginal costs C are independent of firm 
i's scale of operation,30 and so the same for 
all firms at a given point in time. It follows 
from this that the maximum attainable pres- 
29 Nils Gottfries (1988) provides empirical evi- 
dence for such an effect in the case of Swedish 
manufacturing. Gottfries also tests for, but finds 
less support for, the "customer market" effects dis- 
cussed next. 
30 In his treatment in Chapter 8, this is because 
labor is the only factor of production. The same 
result is obtained, however, in a model with capi- 
tal, if it is assumed that capital is mobile between 
firms, and that there are constant returns to scale 
(possibly after meeting overhead costs), as in the 
treatment in Rotemberg and Woodford (1994). 
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ent value of profits is linear in the value of xi 
(for a firm with twice the customer stock of 
another can obtain twice the profits forever 
by pricing in exactly the same way), and q is 
just this maximum value per customer. The 
solution to this problem gives the optimal Pi 
as a function of (P, C, q, Y), that is homoge- 
neous degree one in the first two variables 
and homogeneous degree zero in the last two. 
In equilibrium, when the general price level 
P equals exactly the Pi chosen by each firm in 
this manner, one obtains the ratio of P to C as 
a function of the form 
(L g (3.4) 
where ,u* is a decreasing function. Each firm 
sets its price somewhat lower, in relation to 
its marginal costs, than the point at which in- 
stantaneous profits would be maximized (the 
point at which marginal revenue would equal 
marginal cost), due to the increase in future 
profits that can be obtained by increasing its 
customer stock; the extent to which this is 
true is greater the larger is the expected 
value of an additional customer q in relation 
to current demand Y. 
Note that the index of aggregate demand Y 
must in equilibrium equal the output that 
each firm chooses to supply. The system of 
equations (2.4), (3.1)-(3.2), and (3.4) then 
suffice to determine equilibrium employment 
and output at a point in time, as a function of 
the current value of the "asset price" q. (This 
is an "asset price" in that customers are an 
asset, in which firms can "invest" by charging 
lower prices, foregoing current profits in or- 
der to increase their stock of customers; and 
in that it also corresponds to the present dis- 
counted value of the expected profits of all 
firms in aggregate, and hence to the aggre- 
gate market value of the firms.) 
The role of q in this model of output deter- 
mination illustrates a general theme of the 
book (reflected in its subtitle), that equilib- 
rium unemployment will be low when "asset 
prices" (of various kinds) are high. In the cus- 
tomer market model, this is because a high 
value of q makes firms less willing to exploit 
the temporary inability of their existing cus- 
tomers to find a lower-cost supplier. The re- 
sulting reduction in desired markups shifts 
up the demand wage relation, allowing an 
equilibrium with higher levels of both em- 
ployment and real wages. Furthermore, un- 
like an upward shift in the demand wage rela- 
tion due to technical progress, a shift due to a 
reduction of markups need not raise yw, and 
so need not shift up the wage curve; and an 
increase in output cannot occur except in- 
sofar as employment increases. Thus this 
particular channel for the creation of fluctu- 
ations in equilibrium employment is able 
to explain why fluctuations in employ- 
ment should be significant relative to the as- 
sociated variations in real wages and in out- 
put. 
It remains of course to discuss what deter- 
mines the value of q. As with any asset price, 
the answer is above all expectations regarding 
the future yield on the asset-in the present 
case, the future level of profits per cus- 
tomer-and the real interest rates at which 
those future yields must be discounted in or- 
der to obtain a present value. Hence in 
Phelps' theory, both expectations about fu- 
ture business conditions and interest rates 
become important determinants of labor de- 
mand, and so of equilibrium employment and 
output. In allowing for a channel by which 
business confidence can increase economic 
activity in the short run (and not simply after 
their investments are able to raise productiv- 
ity through an increase in the capital stock), 
Phelps revives a perspective on the source of 
economic fluctuations with a long history, in- 
cluding an important role in Keynes' General 
Theory. The channel through which the "ani- 
mal spirits" of entrepreneurs affect economic 
activity is, however, different here in some 
important respects; for in Phelps' theory, op- 
timism on the part of firms increases aggre- 
gate supply (through the reduction of desired 
markups), rather than affecting only aggre- 
gate demand as in Keynes. This important 
role for expectations is also an important dif- 
ference between Phelps' theory and the 
standard neoclassical model, in which labor 
demand is determined entirely by the current 
capital stock and technology. In the neoclassi- 
cal model, expectations can affect aggregate 
supply, through the effects of the expecta- 
tional variable X on labor supply; but as dis- 
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cussed earlier, one cannot plausibly attribute 
a large role to this channel in the generation 
of aggregate fluctuations. 
Before discussing the consequences that 
Phelps draws from this theory, some com- 
ments about its theoretical foundations are in 
order. It must be observed that the connec- 
tion between the proposed behavioral rela- 
tions (3.3a)-(3.3b) and an underlying lack of 
information about trading opportunities is 
less evident here than in the case of the non- 
Walrasian models of the labor market. This is 
because, in the equilibrium just described, all 
firms choose the same price, and the behav- 
ioral relation (3.3b) seems furthermore to 
presume that customers are aware of the 
common price charged by all firms other than 
i. Thus the fact that all customers do not im- 
mediately desert i in the event that Pi > P 
must be justified in some other way than by 
lack of information about which other firms 
will supply at a lower price. Presumably mi- 
croeconomic foundations for (3.3a)-(3.3b) 
must actually be sought in the existence of 
costs of changing one's supplier that are not 
due simply to lack of information.31 
Perhaps a deeper problem-because it is 
plainly relevant regardless of the source of 
the costs of switching suppliers-concerns 
the myopia implicit in the behavioral rule 
(3.3b) for customers. My objection to this is 
similar to that raised earlier to the inclusion 
of only the current wage and current labor 
market conditions as arguments of (2.2); cus- 
tomers seeking to determine whether to bear 
the costs of switching suppliers should care 
about the future price differential as well as 
the current one. And again, the issue is of 
considerable importance for the form of the 
equilibrium obtained. For Phelps is able to 
greatly simplify his analysis of the dynamic 
pricing problem of the firm by supposing that 
the optimal plan is the same regardless of 
whether the firm commits itself to future 
prices at the time that it chooses its current 
price. But this is not true if the customer 
switching decision is forward-looking. 
In particular, in the absence of commit- 
ment, the firm should not expect its current 
price to have any effect upon the rate at 
which it gains or loses customers, for this 
should depend solely upon customers' expec- 
tations about how it will be optimal for the 
firm to price in the future. Thus each firm 
should at each point in time set its price so as 
to maximize instantaneous revenues with the 
consequence that the equilibrium markup 
should be 
YD 
independent of q (and in fact should be con- 
stant, as in the Dixit-Stiglitz theory). The re- 
sult that firms' pricing policies should be af- 
fected by their desire to attract and retain 
customers would seem to depend upon the 
existence of price commitments. But this in 
turn would mean a fundamental change in 
the structure of the model, especially where 
transition dynamics are concerned, because 
the set of existing price commitments should 
introduce a category of predetermined state 
variable not considered in Phelps' analysis. 
3.2 Consequences of the Theory 
It is nonetheless useful to consider the con- 
sequences of the customer market model for 
the analysis of the effects of . aggregate 
shocks. Partly this is because similar conclu- 
sions about the determinants of labor de- 
mand may also follow from theories with al- 
ternative microeconomic foundations, some 
of which are discussed below. But I would 
also suggest that observing where Phelps' as- 
sumptions lead is of considerable importance 
in deciding whether refinement of the theo- 
retical foundations of the customer market 
model should be regarded as an important 
task. 
The effects of real interest rates on q and 
hence upon labor demand are one of the 
main themes of Phelps' book. This provides a 
channel through which a large number of dif- 
ferent kinds of aggregate shocks and policy 
changes can affect equilibrium employment 
and output in his theory. In particular, distur- 
bances to aggregate demand can induce 
changes in aggregate supply through this 
channel, so that aggregate demand ceases to 
be an unimportant factor in output and em- 
31 This is the approach taken, for example, by 
Gottfries (1988) and Kenneth Froot and Paul 
Klemperer (1989). 
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ployment determination. However, as Phelps 
notes, the type of effects predicted by his 
theory are often anti-Keynesian in spirit. This 
is because disturbances that increase aggre- 
gate demand (at given interest rates) will gen- 
erally raise equilibrium real interest rates; 
but this will then tend to depress asset prices, 
and so to contract labor demand. The result 
can be a contraction of equilibrium output 
and employment (resulting in an even further 
increase in real interest rates, to offset the 
increased demand at given interest rates). 
A simple example of his analysis will have 
to suffice. In the case of a steady state, q 
must satisfy 
Y r (3.5) 
where r is the constant real rate of interest. 
Then equations (3.4)-(3.5) jointly determine 
the steady-state values of q/Y and the 
markup, as functions of the real rate of inter- 
est. In the case of a model with a repre- 
sentative household, the steady-state real rate 
of interest is determined by the rate of time 
preference of this household.32 Now consider 
the consequences of a permanent increase in 
the rate of time preference. If the capital 
stock is fixed (or, as Phelps assumes when 
analyzing this issue in Chapter 8, labor is the 
only factor of production), then there is no 
predetermined state variable in this model, 
and the economy can jump immediately to 
the new steady state following such a perma- 
nent shift in a parameter. By (3.5), the value 
of q/Y that is consistent with any given value 
of g is reduced; because relation (3.4) is un- 
changed, and describes an inverse relation 
between g and q/Y, the steady-state equilib- 
rium markup must rise (and q/Y must fall). 
This implies a contraction in labor demand at 
any given real wage, and should generally be 
expected to result in a contraction of equilib- 
rium employment and output. Phelps con- 
trasts this result with the Keynesian analysis, 
in which a reduction in thrift was held to 
stimulate economic activity, at least in the 
short run. 
Phelps obtains similarly anti-Keynesian 
conclusions, and for similar reasons, as to the 
effects of increased government debt and of 
government purchases (at least, government 
purchases of nondurable consumer goods). 
He argues that such policies should increase 
equilibrium unemployment, by raising real 
interest rates, and hence driving down q, re- 
sulting in higher desired markups and a con- 
traction of labor demand.33 These conclu- 
sions are important for his analysis of the 
persistent increase in unemployment in the 
OECD countries over the last two decades, 
which he partly attributes to the increased 
size of governments and the growth of the 
world stock of government debt. The con- 
clusions are contrary to the Keynesian model, 
in which an increase in real interest rates as a 
result of expansionary fiscal policy should 
increase nominal aggregate demand (by in- 
creasing the velocity of money), and so in- 
crease output and employment, insofar as 
prices are slow to adjust. As Phelps points 
out, they are also to some extent contrary to 
the neoclassical analysis, in which real inter- 
est rate increases are expected to increase 
equilibrium output and employment due to 
intertemporal substitution in labor supply. 
One consequence of the theory that might 
well have been further developed is its impli- 
cation for the effects of financial stringency 
upon firms' supply decisions. In the presence 
of imperfect financial markets, variations 
in the availability of internal funds or in 
the value of assets accepted as collateral 
can cause variations in the shadow value 
of current funds to a firm in addition to 
those caused by variations in market interest 
rates. A number of authors have suggested 
that firms' investment decisions are in fact 
more affected by macroeconomic conditions 
through these channels than by changes in 
real interest rates,34 and such channels are 
often mentioned in discussions of the appar- 
32 This over-simplifies the actual analysis that 
Phelps gives in Chapter 8, for as noted atove, he 
actually assumes Blanchard-style overlapping gen- 
erations. The qualitative result, however, is unaf- 
fected by the simplification in the present case. 
33Again, the effect of government debt on real 
interest rates exists because of his assumption of 
overlapping generations, as a result of which "Ri- 
cardian equivalence" does not hold for his model. 
34 For surveys of this literature, see Mark 
Gertler (1988) and Stiglitz (1992). 
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ent recessionary impact of the collapse of as- 
set prices at the end of the 1980s in the U.S., 
Britain, and Japan. These theories have, how- 
ever, on the whole had to take it as given that 
a reduction in investment demand (due, for 
example, to a sudden lack of suitable collat- 
eral) should also mean reduced output and 
employment, presumably for Keynesian rea- 
sons.35 Phelps' theory would imply that these 
same channels should result in effects upon 
desired markups and hence on aggregate sup- 
ply, so that the recessionary impact of a de- 
cline in collateral values need not be a dis- 
equilibrium phenomenon.36 
The analysis of the model becomes consid- 
erably more complex when open-economy ex- 
tensions are considered. An interesting fea- 
ture of the customer-market model in the 
open-economy context is that it implies that 
purchasing power parity should hold in any 
long-run steady state, while still allowing 
temporary violations of it in equilibrium; one 
country's producers may price their goods 
more expensively than those of another, at 
the price of a loss of market share over time. 
Phelps' most important conclusion from the 
extended analysis is that in an open economy, 
expansionary fiscal policies may stimulate 
employment at home, while contracting it 
abroad. This is because such policies should 
cause an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate, which should tend to lower domestic 
markups and so stimulate labor demand, due 
to the increased competition that domestic 
producers face from foreign suppliers. This 
effect may more than offset the contraction- 
ary effects of the higher real interest rates. 
On the other hand, the effect abroad is un- 
ambiguously contractionary, as labor demand 
is contracted both by the rise in world real 
interest rates and by the real exchange rate 
depreciation. 
The result that fiscal expansion may be 
contractionary abroad while expansionary at 
home is also implied by an open-economy 
Keynesian model, of course, but only in the 
case of a fixed exchange rate system-in 
which case the mechanism is that the foreign 
country is required by the fixed exchange rate 
system to tighten its monetary policy, con- 
tracting aggregate demand. In the case of 
floating exchange rates, the textbook model 
implies that fiscal expansion should be expan- 
sionary abroad as well, as a rise in world in- 
terest rates increases the velocity of money 
worldwide. Phelps argues instead that fiscal 
expansion should be contractionary abroad, 
regardless of the exchange rate regime, for 
wholly nonmonetary reasons. The conclusion 
that loose fiscal policy can be expansionary at 
home after all, due to open-economy effects, 
does not mean that Phelps advocates the use 
of fiscal stimulus as a weapon to combat un- 
employment. For such a policy is a "beggar- 
thy-neighbor" policy in his analysis. Thus he 
advocates international policy coordination to 
jointly reduce the level of fiscal stimulus, in 
order to lower world real interest rates and 
bring about higher employment and eco- 
nomic activity for all. 
3.3 Other Influences on Labor Demand 
A few words are in order about Phelps' 
other two models of factors affecting labor 
demand. In each theory, a high value placed 
on some "asset" raises the demand wage. In 
the model with "investment in employees," 
firms face a cost of training new employees, 
as a result of which the employment decision 
at each point in time is to some extent an 
investment decision. Phelps shows that in this 
case the demand wage, at any given level of 
employment, is increasing in the shadow 
value of additions to the stock of trained em- 
ployees. In the two-sector model, capital 
goods and consumption goods are produced 
using distinct technologies, so that their rela- 
tive price may vary in equilibrium. Phelps 
then argues that if the capital good is the 
35 It is sometimes suggested (see the authors 
just cited) that financial constraints should have a 
direct effect upon firms' supply decisions, gener- 
ally through some version of the argument that 
production takes time and hence that financing 
costs are part of the marginal cost of production. 
But it seems much less plausible that this direct 
effect upon the demand wage should be quantita- 
tively significant, than a potential effect of finan- 
cial constraints upon desired markups, due to the 
small share of financing costs in the marginal cost 
of production. 
36Gottfries (1991) presents a model in which 
counter-cyclical markups result from the interac- 
tion between financial market imperfections and 
customer markets. See also the remarks in Stiglitz 
(1992). 
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more labor-intensive, the demand wage (for a 
given aggregate capital stock and given tech- 
nologies) at any given level of aggregate em- 
ployment will be an increasing function of 
the relative price of capital goods, by the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem.37 
In the case of each of these theories, the 
"asset price" that affects the demand wage is 
determined in a way similar to the variable q 
above-it will be equal to the present value, 
at market rates of return, of a stream of ex- 
pected future yields on the asset. Thus the 
theory has a similar ultimate structure in 
each case, and in particular high real interest 
rates are predicted to contract labor demand 
through each of these channels. Thus Phelps 
emphasizes the similarities between the pre- 
dictions of the three theories, and speaks of 
common set of "structuralist" predictions (see 
Chs. 6, 10, and 14). 
One result that is special to the two-sector 
model is of some importance to Phelps' over- 
all conclusions. In that model, an increase in 
government purchases of the labor-intensive 
capital goods sector can increase employment 
and output, even in a closed economy, by bid- 
ding up the relative price of the capital good. 
Thus Phelps distinguishes, in his general con- 
clusions regarding the effects of fiscal policy, 
between government purchases of capital 
goods (and more generally, purchases of rela- 
tively labor-intensive goods, including direct 
government employment) and purchases of 
consumption goods; the former should in- 
crease equilibrium employment, while the 
latter should reduce it (at least in a closed 
economy), as argued above. In this way he is 
able to reconcile his results with the familiar 
observation that government spending in- 
creases economic activity during wartime; he 
argues that military purchases consist to a 
larger extent of capital goods purchases and 
direct employment of labor than do govern- 
ment purchases generally. 
He also concludes that government spend- 
ing can be used to increase employment in 
times of depression-perhaps the conclusion 
of Keynes' most responsible for his enduring 
fame-but cautions that it is only public em- 
ployment and capital-goods purchases that 
should work, not programs that increase con- 
sumption spending. Thus part of Keynes' 
message-the most scandalous part in the 
eyes of economists of the time, namely his 
advocacy of consumption and scorn for thrift, 
for the sake of providing employment-is ar- 
gued to have been mistaken. And Phelps sug- 
gests that the record of the means by which 
the industrialized nations lifted themselves 
out of the Depression does not actually con- 
firm this particular aspect of Keynes' teach- 
ing. 
The three theories appear to have differing 
implications in other important respects as 
well, even if Phelps does not discuss them. In 
particular, shocks or policy changes that re- 
duce the expected returns to capital-such as 
an increase in the price of energy inputs, a 
reduction in tax incentives for purchases of 
capital goods, or pessimism about the future 
demand for the specialized products that the 
capital goods can be used to produce-should 
lower the relative price of capital goods, but 
should also lower the real rate of interest. As 
a result, they might well raise the other two 
types of "asset prices" emphasized in Phelps' 
theory-and so could stimulate labor demand 
through those channels, while they should 
contract it through the price-of-capital chan- 
nel. (This is of some importance in the analy- 
sis of the effects of an oil shock, as discussed 
below.) 
It should also be noted that Phelps' three 
theories are not the only available theories 
that introduce additional real determinants of 
labor demand, and so provide channels 
through which aggregate shocks can affect 
equilibrium employment. Other, equally co- 
herent, theories do not always lead to the 
same conclusions.38 For example, the model 
37 Phelps actually weakens the case for this ef- 
fect of changes in the relative price of capital 
goods by assuming that existing capital goods can 
be costlessly shifted between sectors in response 
to the relative price change. If one takes the capi- 
tal stocks of the consumption and capital goods- 
producing sectors to each be given in the short 
run, then an increase in the relative price of capi- 
tal goods must unambiguously raise the demand 
wage (in units of a consumption good numeraire), 
regardless of the relative capital intensities of the 
two sectors. 
38Phelps briefly discusses some of the alterna- 
tives at the end of Chapter 10, but ignores them in 
most of his analysis. 
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with oligopolistic product markets of Rotem- 
berg and Woodford (1992b) also implies that, 
due to the presence of market power, the de- 
mand wage relation must be modified as in 
(3.2). This model also implies that the 
markup is determined by a relation of the 
form (3.4), where again q is a measure of the 
present value of expected future profits 
(though it cannot in this case be interpreted 
as the value of a customer). Similar factors 
thus determine labor demand; but in the Ro- 
temberg-Woodford model, the function g* is 
an increasing, rather than a decreasing func- 
tion of its argument. (A greater value as- 
signed to future industry profits, relative to 
current demand, increases the fear of a price 
war and so increases the amount of collusion 
that is incentive-compatible.) The conse- 
quence is that all of the above conclusions 
about the effects of real interest rates on ag- 
gregate supply hold with the opposite sign. 
Phelps' theoretical analysis certainly serves 
to establish one fundamental point. There are 
a large number of reasons why aggregate 
shocks, including disturbances to aggregate 
demand, can in principle have important ef- 
fects upon labor demand. It is thus clearly 
possible to develop a theory of fluctuations in 
equilibrium employment, that assigns an im- 
portant role to aggregate shocks, and without 
having to rely crucially upon the somewhat 
implausible channel of intertemporal substi- 
tution in labor supply. It remains to be deter- 
mined whether the particular effects that he 
stresses are in fact of practical importance. 
4. Empirical Support for the Phelpsian 
Mechanisms 
Phelps presents two different sorts of argu- 
ments for the empirical validity of his theory. 
The first is a set of regression results (Ch. 17) 
intended to estimate the quantitative impor- 
tance of certain of the effects predicted by 
his models. The second is a collection of re- 
marks about how specific historical events 
and trends can be interpreted in the light of 
the theory, culminating in a discussion (Ch. 
18) of how the broad movements in the un- 
employment rate in the industrialized nations 
since World War II can be understood. I first 
consider the econometric analysis. 
4.1 Econometric Evidence 
The centerpiece of Chapter 17 is a jointly 
estimated set of regression equations to ex- 
plain the time series behavior of unemploy- 
ment rates in each of 17 countries. The ex- 
planatory variables consist of a set of 
domestic variables for each country (includ- 
ing the total capital stock, the real public 
debt, real government spending, and some 
tax variables), a set of world variables that are 
the same for each country (a world real inter- 
est rate and the world price of oil), and the 
country's lagged unemployment rate. The co- 
efficient on explanatory variable k in the re- 
gression for country i is assumed to be of the 
form aibk, where ai is a "sensitivity factor" for 
each country and bk is a weight for the par- 
ticular explanatory factor that is assumed to 
be the same for all countries (hence the joint 
estimation). Using this approach, a higher 
world price of oil is found to increase unem- 
ployment in each country; this supports the 
view that real, supply-side factors are impor- 
tant, and the sign is what one would expect, 
given that higher oil prices should depress 
the demand wage at a given level of employ- 
ment. A higher world real interest rate (a 
weighted average of the ex post real rates in 
the various countries) is also found to in- 
crease unemployment. This is what Phelps' 
theories would predict, through the effect of 
the world real interest rate on domestic inter- 
est rates and asset prices (and through them 
on labor demand, as explained in the pre- 
vious section). Higher taxes of certain kinds 
(direct taxes, and payroll taxes for those coun- 
tries for which the data were available) are 
also found to increase unemployment; this ef- 
fect is consistent with a broad range of equi- 
librium theories of unemployment. 
The domestic fiscal variables are found to 
have the sort of effects that Keynesian theory 
would predict: higher government purchases 
and higher government debt both lower the 
country's unemployment rate. A higher do- 
mestic capital stock is found to increase un- 
employment; this could be given a Keynesian 
interpretation (investment demand should be 
higher when the capital stock is currently 
low), but is contrary to what the most obvious 
effect upon aggregate supply would suggest 
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as an equilibrium outcome. Phelps reconciles 
these results with his theory through the ar- 
gument that domestic fiscal stimulus (or a 
low domestic capital stock) should cause a 
real exchange rate appreciation, which should 
lower domestic markups (due to increased 
competition from foreign suppliers) and in 
this way raise the demand wage. Thus he re- 
lies upon the real exchange rate effect upon 
markups to offset the contractionary effects 
upon labor demand of the higher domestic 
real interest rates and the lower marginal 
product of labor, that his theories would also 
predict for these cases. 
These regressions are supplemented by a 
regression equation for the world real inter- 
est rate, using as explanatory variables a 
measure of the world capital stock, the world 
stock of public debt, world government 
spending, and the world oil price. This re- 
gression allows Phelps to compute the net ef- 
fect upon unemployment of world fiscal 
stimulus, taking into account both the domes- 
tic effect of fiscal stimulus in each country, 
and the effect on each country's unemploy- 
ment through the effect on world real inter- 
est rates. He finds that worldwide fiscal 
stimulus is contractionary worldwide, as his 
theory predicts, because higher world public 
spending or higher world public debt in- 
creases the world real interest rate by enough 
to more than offset the domestic stimulus 
that would occur if the world real interest 
rate did not change. This conclusion, he ar- 
gues, not only supports the "structuralist" 
theory, but is contrary to the predictions of 
the Keynesian model and the standard neo- 
classical model alike. 
These results are certainly suggestive, and 
the author is to be commended for having 
begun the laborious task of marshalling the 
relevant econometric evidence. Nonetheless, 
a conclusive study of the issues raised will re- 
quire much further work. The proposed in- 
terpretation of the reduced-form regressions 
just described, for example, depends upon re- 
garding the explanatory variables as exoge- 
nous. In many cases, this is problematic. Con- 
sider the finding of most direct relevance to 
Phelps' theory, the positive association be- 
tween world real interest rates and unem- 
ployment. It is not obvious that this must in- 
dicate a causal effect of real interest rates on 
unemployment; a common shock affecting 
unemployment in many countries might also 
affect world interest rates. (For example, a 
common favorable supply shock could both 
increase employment and lower world real in- 
terest rates, in order to induce consumption 
of the increased output.) This problem is not 
eliminated when the actual world real inter- 
est rate is replaced by the fitted series (Table 
17.5), except insofar as the explanatory vari- 
ables in the interest rate regression do not 
include variables that might respond to such 
shocks. But these variables include such cy- 
clically sensitive variables as the world stock 
of real public debt (that responds both to un- 
expected government revenue shortfalls and 
to unexpected inflation) and an inflation-ac- 
celeration variable. The interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients on the public debt and 
public expenditure variables-also among the 
results of most significance for Phelps-is 
similarly problematic due to the potential en- 
dogeneity of these variables. 
Furthermore, the reduced-form estimates, 
even taken at face value, do not represent a 
very direct test of the mechanisms described 
in the book's theoretical chapters. One would 
like to know, for example, whether the do- 
mestic capital stock, public debt, and public 
expenditure variables affect the real exchange 
rate in the way that is necessary for Phelps' 
interpretation of the signs of these coeffi- 
cients-or whether their effects on unem- 
ployment occur through other channels, per- 
haps more traditional ones. One would 
similarly like to know whether high world 
real interest rates raise markups and depress 
the demand wage, as in Phelps' theory, or 
whether their effect upon unemployment 
comes about in some other way-through a 
shift in the equilibrium wage curve,39 or per- 
haps because countries tighten monetary pol- 
39Phelps cites Manning (1990) as another study 
that finds a negative effect of real interest rates on 
employment. However, apart from the fact that 
Manning describes his findings with regard to in- 
terest rates as "mixed," one should note that Man- 
ning estimates the effects of real interest rates on 
a dynamic wage-setting relation, and presents no 
evidence regarding their effects on labor demand, 
or on equilibrium employment. 
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icy in order to defend their exchange rates in 
the face of high foreign interest rates. 
Phelps does present two further regres- 
sions intended to estimate crucial links in his 
theoretical account. One regresses the 
change in each country's relative markup 
(i.e., its markup relative to a weighted aver- 
age of all countries' markups) on the change 
in its multilateral real exchange rate. Real ex- 
change rate appreciations are found to be as- 
sociated with reductions in the relative 
markup, as had earlier been argued to be 
theoretically plausible. The second regresses 
the change in each country's relative unem- 
ployment rate (similarly defined) on the 
change in its relative markup. Countries with 
larger than average markup increases are 
found to have larger than average increases in 
unemployment, as one would expect if higher 
markups depress the demand wage, as indi- 
cated in (3.2). 
These two regressions are indeed consis- 
tent with Phelps' theory, and they can be in- 
terpreted as providing evidence for crucial 
relationships that were relied upon in his ac- 
count of the effects of the fiscal policy vari- 
ables. But again, even taking them at face 
value they substantiate only part of Phelps' 
story. They suggest that markup variations 
are indeed an important determinant of em- 
ployment variations. But many different mod- 
els of imperfectly competitive product mar- 
kets would be equally consistent with these 
results; in particular, they are perfectly con- 
sistent with the oligopolistic model of Rotem- 
berg and Woodford (1992b), even though 
that model differs sharply from Phelps' in its 
predictions about the effects of world real in- 
terest rate increases and world fiscal stimu- 
lus. One wonders why there is no discussion 
of the relationship between real interest rates 
and markups.40 
4.2. Comments on Macroeconomic 
History 
The second type of evidence that Phelps 
offers in support of his theory consists of il- 
lustrations of how the theory can explain the 
historical consequences of particular shocks. 
These discussions are of particular interest 
insofar as the issue of exogeneity can to some 
extent be clarified in these cases, although 
none of the episodes in question can quite be 
regarded as a controlled experiment. I briefly 
mention two of the most interesting of these. 
The wartime booms. It is well-known that 
economic activity is frequently vigorous in 
times of war, and World War II in particular 
was a period of unusually high output in the 
U.S. Phelps' explanation is that military pur- 
chases of capital goods as opposed to con- 
sumption goods bid up the relative price of 
capital goods, thus increasing the demand 
wage. He cites as a particular success of his 
explanation the fact that it is consistent with 
the observation of low real interest rates in 
the U.S. during World Wars I and II. In the 
two-sector model, capital-goods purchases 
that raise the relative price of capital goods 
also lower the real rate of interest, and this is 
consistent with the stimulus to employment 
and output. Indeed, the low interest rates 
should stimulate labor demand through his 
other two channels as well. Phelps cites this 
as a success of his theory, relative to both the 
Keynesian theory and the neoclassical theory 
(pp. 134-35), in that the latter theories allow 
government spending to increase output only 
insofar as it causes interest rates to rise. 
But the low real interest rates are hardly a 
problem for Keynesian theory, which can at- 
tribute them to expansionary monetary pol- 
icy. (The expansionary fiscal policy is still cru- 
cial to explaining the wartime boom in such 
an account, for it allows a greater increase in 
output before the zero nominal interest rate 
bound limits the degree to which monetary 
policy alone can stimulate economic activity.) 
And it is not clear that low real interest rates 
could not coincide with a boom in the neo- 
classical model as well (with sufficiently com- 
plex expectations about the future path of fis- 
cal policy). For what is needed to stimulate 
labor supply in that model is an increase in X, 
40 Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) estimate a 
relation of the form (3.4) on postwar U.S. data, 
using a variety of estimation strategies and proxies 
for fhe "asset price" q, and consistently find that 
the relation between q and the average markup 
has the opposite sign to that predicted by the cus- 
tomer market theory. Similarly, U.S. short-term 
real interest rates are strongly negatively corre- 
lated with their measure of the average U.S. 
markup. 
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not necessarily due to an increase in the real 
rate of interest. 
And rather awkwardly for Phelps' interpre- 
tation, military spending since World War II 
has not been associated with low real interest 
rates. While the evidence is not clear-cut, 
there is a certain amount of evidence that 
military spending is associated with higher 
than average real rates. (See Barro, 1989, for 
discussion of this, as well as for evidence of 
higher real interest rates in wartime prior to 
the twentieth century.) Indeed, Phelps' own 
real interest rate regression (Table 17.1) indi- 
cates that world military spending raises the 
world real interest rate.41 But in all of his 
models, the increased real interest rates 
should contract output and employment. Yet 
periods of increased military spending have 
been associated with higher levels of employ- 
ment and output in the postwar period as 
well, at least for the U.S. (Rotemberg and 
Woodford 1992b). 
A likely interpretation, in my view, of the 
different behavior of real interest rates dur- 
ing the World Wars would have to do with 
the extensive price controls and rationing 
during those wars. Real interest rates need 
not rise to crowd out private sector demand if 
that demand is constrained by rationing; thus 
one need not attribute the low real rates to a 
direct relative price effect of the government 
spending. The controls may also have ac- 
counted for the increase in aggregate supply; 
in the case of firms with market power, the 
imposition of price controls may well have 
forced a reduction in markups, thus raising 
the demand wage as indicated in (3.2). Under 
this interpretation, these two wars do not 
provide an interesting test of alternative mod- 
els of the effects of government purchases in 
the absence of price controls and rationing. 
The postwar experience should be more rele- 
vant in that regard, and there the data do not 
seem to fit well with Phelps' theory.42 
European unemployment in the 1980s. The 
dramatic and sustained rise in unemployment 
rates in most of Europe during the 1980s pro- 
vides a striking challenge for economic the- 
ory, and is clearly one of the sources of 
Phelps' conviction that unemployment vari- 
ations must be understood as equilibrium re- 
sponses to real forces. Phelps attributes this 
principally to the effects of two external 
shocks: the second oil shock in 1979, and 
world fiscal stimulus in the mid-80s-a large 
increase in the world stock of public debt, 
and some increase in public spending as well, 
both largely as a result of loose U.S. fiscal 
policy. It is Phelps' account of the effects of 
the latter shock that is the less conventional 
aspect of his analysis. As noted earlier, he ar- 
gues on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds that foreign fiscal expansion should 
be contractionary at home-first, because the 
rise induced in world real interest rates low- 
ers asset prices and thus depresses labor de- 
mand at home (through any one of Phelps' 
three channels), and second, because it 
should cause a real depreciation of the home 
currency, reducing foreign competition and 
so providing a further impetus to increased 
markups at home, again contracting labor de- 
mand. 
In support of his story are the dramatic 
facts of high world real interest rates in the 
mid-80s, and of the sharp real appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar against the European curren- 
cies, both often attributed to unusually loose 
U.S. fiscal policy. (This general interpretation 
of the rise in European unemployment was 
first presented in Jean-Paul Fitoussi and 
Phelps 1988.) Note that in the Keynesian 
model, neither effect should have been a 
source of unemployment in Europe (quite 
the contrary), insofar as the dollar was float- 
ing against the European currencies at this 
time. 
41 He comments that "this finding is in no way 
troubling," because two out of three of his models 
predict that military purchases should raise real 
interest rates (p. 317). He neglects to note that 
these are the models that also predict that military 
purchases should contract output. 
42 Rotemberg and Woodford (1992b) argue that 
one does need a model in which government pur- 
chases can affect labor demand in order to ac- 
count for that experience, and that as a conse- 
quence the neoclassical model is inadequate. We 
show that a model with oligopolistic collusion in 
the product market fits this aspect of the data; that 
mo el would also be consistent with the observa- 
tion of an increase in real interest rates when mili- 
tary purchases increase. Incidentally, we looked 
for evidence of relative price effects of military 
purchases of the kind stressed by Phelps in the 
postwar U.S. data, and did not find them. 
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Even the importance of the oil shock, how- 
ever, deserves some comment; for the consis- 
tency of the observed effects with Phelps' 
theory is not entirely clear. He appears to 
take it for granted that the estimated effect of 
the world oil price in his unemployment re- 
gressions is what theory predicts. But while it 
is obvious that an increase in the cost of en- 
ergy inputs should lower the demand wage, 
in his theory it should also shift down the 
wage curve, due to the decline in non-wage 
incomes. Indeed, as noted earlier, insofar as 
one analyzes the effects as equivalent to a de- 
cline in the productivity factor A, there 
should be no effect upon equilibrium unem- 
ployment, except insofar as it is due to some 
other source of shifts in the demand wage re- 
lation, such as a change in the markup. And 
quite apart from the issue of the predicted 
shift in the wage curve, the reduction in the 
demand wage that results directly from the 
added cost of energy inputs is not very large, 
because of the small share of these costs in 
total marginal costs. Thus the significant con- 
tractionary effect of the oil shock, if accepted 
as a fact, must be explained by one or another 
of the nontraditional sources of shifts in labor 
demand discussed in the previous section. 
In fact, Rotemberg and Woodford (1994) 
find, through numerical simulation of a gen- 
eral equilibrium "customer market" model, 
that labor demand is actually contracted less 
by an increase in oil prices in such a model 
than in a model with a fixed markup (due to 
monopolistic competition of the Dixit-Stiglitz 
type). This is because the increased cost of 
energy reduces the expected returns to capi- 
tal, and as a result lowers the real interest 
rate. One possible solution would be to stress 
the effects upon labor demand of a decline in 
the relative price of capital goods; this Phelp- 
sian channel could still operate to contract 
labor demand, because the "asset price" in 
question can decline despite the fall in the 
real interest rate.43 (In the Rotemberg-Wood- 
ford simulation this channel is inoperative, 
because capital goods and consumption goods 
are treated as perfect substitutes.) This illus- 
trates a case in which the alternative "struc- 
turalist" models do not simply reinforce one 
another's implications. 
Alternatively, one might argue that oil 
price increases actually raise the real interest 
rate. This is what Phelps' real-interest-rate 
regression asserts (Table 17.1), and Barro and 
Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1990) find the same. 
The latter authors interpret this as showing 
that an oil price increase reduces the supply 
of savings to an even greater extent than it 
reduces investment demand. It remains to be 
shown that this interpretation can be recon- 
ciled with a model of household decisions, 
and that, under the conditions required for 
this, the oil shock should significantly con- 
tract labor demand. For example, the greater 
effect on savings than on investment makes 
more sense if the increased oil prices are ex- 
pected to be relatively transitory. But in this 
case, the increase in real interest rates is less 
likely to imply a reduction of q/Y-the vari- 
able that actually determines the markup in 
the "customer market" model-because cur- 
rent output Y decreases while future output 
(that determines q) changes relatively little, 
and the real interest rate increase should also 
expected to be only transitory. Thus the ques- 
tion of whether Phelps' models can account 
quantitatively for the facts, even in the case 
of the oil shock, requires further analysis than 
it is given in this volume. 
What of the effects attributed to fiscal pol- 
icy? The suggestion that loose U.S. fiscal pol- 
icy caused the high world real interest rates 
and the appreciation of the dollar is a familiar 
one, though highly controversial. But even 
accepting this, and accepting that an impor- 
tant part of the contraction of employment 
should be attributed to these events, it is not 
clear that this can be considered a clear dem- 
onstration of Phelps' thesis that high real in- 
terest rates contract labor demand. For in his 
story, the strong appreciation of the dollar 
plays a crucial role, explaining the different 
experience of the U.S. relative to most other 
OECD countries during the mid-80s. But 
once one grants that the real exchange rate 
has an important effect on labor demand- 
43 An alternative solution is to rely upon a 
model in which the real interest rate decline raises 
markups. Rotemberg and Woodford (1994) show 
that a model with oligopolistic product markets is 
able to generate declines in both output and real 
wages in response to an oil shock that are of the 
same magnitude as those estimated using U.S. data. 
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that, again, may well indicate that product 
markets are imperfectly competitive-it is 
not obvious that an additional effect of real 
interest rates or asset prices on markups is 
needed to explain the contraction in Europe. 
(After all, real interest rates were higher in 
the U.S. in the mid-80s than in Europe, so 
one cannot attribute too much of Europe's 
plight to the high real interest rates without 
having difficulty explaining why unemploy- 
ment did not rise more in the U.S.) Again, 
quantitative analysis of a structural model is 
needed-instead of the simple discussion of 
how much of the rise in unemployment is ex- 
plained by different explanatory variables in 
Phelps' reduced-form regressions-in order 
to determine the extent to which the distinc- 
tive mechanisms proposed in this book can 
actually improve our ability to explain this se- 
quence of events. 
An obvious difficulty for Phelps' explana- 
tion, as Charles Bean (1994) points out, is 
that it does not account for the striking dif- 
ference between the unemployment experi- 
ence of the European Community and that of 
non-EC Europe and of Japan. For the high 
world real interest rates and the appreciated 
dollar should have affected equally all of 
these countries, yet the large increase in un- 
employment in the early and mid-80s oc- 
curred only in the EC countries. Another 
problem for Phelps' model is explaining the 
persistence of the increase in European un- 
employment. While unemployment in the 
European Community peaked in about 1985, 
it has not yet returned to.levels nearly as low 
as those of 1980, let alone to those prior to 
the first oil shock. Yet both the real price of 
oil and the value of the dollar sharply de- 
clined after 1985, and by most measures 
world real interest rates fell significantly as 
well (even if real rates in Europe have never 
returned to the levels of the 1970s). Many 
students of European unemployment have 
sought to explain this by developing theoreti- 
cal models of unemployment persistence, so 
that the negative shocks of the early 1980s 
could cause an increase in unemployment 
that would continue long after its original 
cause had subsided (Blanchard and Lawrence 
Summers 1986; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 
1991, ch. 8; and Lindbeck 1993, ch. 7). 
Phelps' theoretical models do not emphasize 
sources of persistence, though his unemploy- 
ment regressions include a lagged unemploy- 
ment rate, and for the EC countries he finds 
that this term has a coefficient of .75 for an- 
nual data. (Recall that in the simple closed- 
economy customer-market model presented 
in the previous section, drawn from Phelps' 
Ch. 8, there are no predetermined state vari- 
ables, so that unemployment is at every point 
in time determined solely by current and ex- 
pected future disturbances.44) This is a direc- 
tion of extension of his theoretical framework 
that surely deserves attention. 
Thus a great deal of work remains to be 
done, in order to clarify both the theoretical 
foundations and the empirical applicability of 
the particular mechanisms stressed by 
Phelps. But such a comment should not be 
taken as intending to minimize the accom- 
plishment of this book. It is exactly because 
Phelps is willing to try to put the pieces to- 
gether, and offer a vision of what the conse- 
quences of the new macroeconomics should 
be, that the book is so important. He amply 
demonstrates how much turns upon a correct 
understanding of the macroeconomic conse- 
quences of market structure. One can only 
hope that this first bold effort will stimulate 
others to follow the trail blazed here. 
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